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Preface
Preface
The Health Systems in Transition (HiT) series consists of two lines of studies: 
a)  HiTs, which are country-based reviews that provide a detailed description 
of a health system and of reform and policy initiatives in progress or 
under development in a specific country. Each review is produced by 
country experts in collaboration with the Observatory’s staff. In order to 
facilitate comparisons between countries, reviews are based on a template, 
which is revised periodically. The template provides detailed guidelines 
and specific questions, definitions and examples needed to compile a 
report; and
b) special issues, which are comparative, cross-country studies on a specific 
topic of importance to policy-makers. 
HiTs seek to provide relevant information to support policy-makers and 
analysts in the development of health systems in Europe. They are building 
blocks that can be used:
• to learn in detail about different approaches to the organization,  
financing and delivery of health services and the role of the main  
actors in health systems;
• to describe the institutional framework, the process, content and 
implementation of health care reform programmes;
• to highlight challenges and areas that require more in-depth analysis;
• to provide a tool for the dissemination of information on health systems 
and the exchange of experiences of reform strategies between policy-
makers and analysts in different countries;
• to assist other researchers in more in-depth comparative health  
policy analysis; and
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• to draw out experiences in different countries and flag up the similarities 
and divergences between them.
Special issues build on existing knowledge from the country-based reviews; 
they synthesize and expand it using additional data sources, peer-reviewed and 
grey literature as well as the input of relevant country experts. 
Compiling the HiT studies poses a number of methodological problems. 
In many countries, there is relatively little information available on the health 
system and the impact of reforms. Due to the lack of a uniform data source, 
quantitative data on health services are based on a number of different sources, 
including the World Health Organization (WHO) Regional Office for Europe’s 
European Health for All database, data from national statistical offices, Eurostat, 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Health 
Data, data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators and any other relevant sources considered useful 
by the authors. Data collection methods and definitions sometimes vary, but 
typically are consistent within each separate review.
A standardized review has certain disadvantages because the financing 
and delivery of health care differ across countries. However, it also offers 
advantages, because it raises similar issues and questions. HiTs can be used to 
inform policy-makers about experiences in other countries that may be relevant 
to their own national situation. They can also be used to inform comparative 
analysis of health systems. This series is an ongoing initiative and material is 
updated at regular intervals.
Comments and suggestions for the further development and improvement of 
the series are most welcome and can be sent to info@obs.euro.who.int.
The series is available on the Observatory’s web site  
(http://www.healthobservatory.eu).
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Abstract
Abstract
In the context of pharmaceutical care, policy-makers repeatedly face the challenge of balancing patient access to effective medicines with affordability and rising costs. With the aim of guiding the health policy 
discourse towards questions that are important to actual and potential patients, 
this study investigates a broad range of regulatory measures, spanning 
marketing authorization to generic substitution and resulting price levels in a 
sample of 16 European health systems (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, England, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, 
Portugal, Scotland, Spain and Sweden). 
All countries employ a mix of regulatory mechanisms to contain 
pharmaceutical expenditure and ensure quality and efficiency in pharmaceutical 
care, albeit with varying configurations and rigour. This variation also 
influences the extent of publicly financed pharmaceutical costs. Overall, 
observed differences in pharmaceutical expenditure should be interpreted in 
conjunction with the differing volume and composition of consumption and 
price levels, as well as dispensation practices and their impact on measurement 
of pharmaceutical costs.
No definitive evidence has yet been produced on the effects of different 
cost-containment measures on patient outcomes. Depending on the foremost 
policy concerns in each country, different levers will have to be used to enable 
the delivery of appropriate care at affordable prices.
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Executive summary
In the context of pharmaceutical care, policy-makers repeatedly face the challenge of balancing patient access to effective medicines with affordability and rising costs. The main goal of this study is to illustrate direct and 
indirect regulatory strategies shaping pharmaceutical care in different European 
countries in a systematic, comparative manner in the hopes of guiding the 
health policy discourse towards questions that are important to those covered in 
publicly financed (statutory) systems – and thus to actual and potential patients – 
particularly regarding quality of care. 
The investigation spans measures related to marketing authorization; pricing 
and price updates; post-marketing evaluations guiding coverage decisions 
(health technology assessment); patient cost-sharing; specific cost and quality 
control measures targeting individual stakeholder groups (manufacturers, 
wholesalers/pharmacists, prescribers); generic substitution; and resulting price 
levels.
A sample of 16 European health systems was selected (Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, England, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Scotland, Spain and Sweden). Quantitative 
data from the OECD and country-specific regulatory documents, as well as 
published and grey literature, were combined to form an initial evidence base 
in the form of health system profiles, which were then sent to relevant experts 
for review and validation.
All countries employ a mix of regulatory mechanisms to contain 
pharmaceutical expenditure and ensure quality and efficiency in pharmaceutical 
care, albeit with varying configurations and rigour. This variation also 
influences the extent of publicly financed pharmaceutical costs. Overall, 
observed differences in pharmaceutical expenditure should be interpreted in 
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conjunction with the differing volume and composition of consumption and 
price levels, as well as dispensation practices and their impact on measurement 
of pharmaceutical costs. 
While for some countries timely and/or equitable access to new medicines 
may constitute a priority – or pose a substantial challenge – others may primarily 
be concerned with quality of care and containing public pharmaceutical 
expenditure. With the proliferation of specialty medicines and recent examples 
of high-cost pharmaceuticals with proven therapeutic benefit and substantial 
target populations, sustainability of financing in pharmaceutical care is another 
overarching concern to be addressed. 
No definitive evidence has yet been produced on the effects of different 
cost-containment measures on patient outcomes. Depending on the foremost 
policy concerns in each country, different levers will have to be used to enable 
the delivery of appropriate care at affordable prices; monitoring of implemented 
regulation is vital to ensure that patient access and sustainability of financing 
are taken into account.
1. Introduction
1. Introduction
In the context of pharmaceutical care, policy-makers repeatedly face the challenge of balancing patient access to effective medicines with affordability and rising costs. The main goal of this study is to illustrate 
direct and indirect strategies shaping pharmaceutical care in different 
European countries in a systematic, comparative manner and based on selected 
parameters. It is hoped that its results will guide the health policy discourse 
towards questions that are important to those covered in publicly financed 
(statutory) systems – and thus to actual and potential patients – particularly 
regarding quality of care. 
The work underlying this study was initially commissioned by the German 
Federal Association of Sickness Funds. Pharmaceutical care for statutorily 
insured individuals in Germany remains a central issue on the health policy 
agenda even after the 2011 legislative changes, which introduced value-based 
pricing for newly authorized medicines on the basis of patient-oriented benefit. 
The focus of current discussions lies mainly with resulting prices, or rather 
with reimbursement amounts negotiated between the Federal Association 
of Sickness Funds and pharmaceutical companies on the basis of added 
patient benefit as determined by the Federal Joint Committee. In this context, 
international approaches towards pharmaceutical regulation in general and 
pricing in particular have also been gaining attention. 
The country sample was chosen to include all EU Member States which, like 
Germany, had joined the Union before 2004 (EU15) but replacing Luxembourg 
with Germany’s largest non-EU15 neighbour, Poland. As a result, information 
on the following countries is considered in this report: Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Out of the four 
jurisdictions of the National Health Service (NHS) in the United Kingdom, 
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England and Scotland were included as they are both the most populous and 
the ones where distinct information was available for the majority of variables 
explored in the analysis.
To provide insights into a wide spectrum of strategies shaping pharmaceutical 
care, the overall aim of the study was operationalized as follows:
1. Context/Overview of pharmaceutical care: What do statistical figures 
reveal about pharmaceutical care and expenditure (public expenditure, 
patient cost-sharing, consumption)? (See Chapter 2)
2. Marketing authorization: What is the interplay between marketing 
authorization (regulatory approval) and post-marketing evaluation, pricing 
and the availability of pharmaceuticals in the publicly financed (statutory) 
health system? How does this affect time-to-market and/or patient access? 
(See Chapter 3)
3. Post-marketing evaluations/Health Technology Assessment: Which 
institutions are responsible for determining “benefit” and “value” of 
pharmaceuticals? What are their processes, methods and criteria in 
doing so and how are they determined? What are the possible outcomes 
of evaluation, i.e. a) is there a positive and/or negative list and b) are 
reimbursement restrictions possible at this stage and if so, based on which 
criteria? How common are reimbursement restrictions? (See Chapter 5 
and Annex, Part II)
4. Reimbursement price: How are reimbursement prices determined? Are 
referencing strategies utilized? If so, which countries are included in the 
referencing basket and (how) are these weighted? Is there one (universal) 
reimbursement price for all patients (for example, based on indication), 
settings and payers or, if not, what determines variability? Are applicable 
VAT rates dependent on pharmaceutical type? (See Chapter 4)
5. Revisions of prices and/or reimbursement: Are pricing and reimbursement 
decisions revisited in a systematic (for example, annually) or ad hoc 
manner following specific triggers? Do such processes only concern 
individual pharmaceuticals or are general revisions of, for example, an 
entire class in the Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical classification system 
(ATC) or the entire formulary possible? (See Chapters 4 and 5)
6. Are there specific measures for (new), particularly costly pharmaceuticals, 
for example managed entry agreements (MEAs) or value-based pricing 
or other mechanisms of cost control (rebates, public tendering, etc.)? (See 
Chapters 5 and 7)
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7. Patient cost-sharing: If copayments are required for pharmaceuticals, how 
high are they? Do they vary based on product (for example, indication, 
effectiveness or innovation) or patient (for example, age, income) 
characteristics? Are there specific measures for financial protection 
(including the availability of complementary health insurance packages)? 
(See Chapter 6)
8. Other efficiency or quality assurance measures relevant to patient 
access: Are there measures that de facto steer patient access or lead to 
potential limitations? If so, do these primarily target a) manufacturers 
(for example, rebates), b) pharmacists and/or wholesalers (for example, 
clawbacks, generic substitution), or c) physicians/prescribers (for example, 
pharmaceutical budgets, volume caps, prescribing guidelines, pay for 
performance, prescription monitoring)? (See Chapter 7)
9. Generics: How is generic substitution regulated? How high is the market 
share of generics? (See Chapter 8)
10. International price comparisons and price levels in comparator countries: 
Are there recent international price comparisons available? What are the 
methodological pitfalls to consider? What do we know about relative 
prices in included countries? (See Chapter 9)
Multiple sources were used to put together information on the aspects 
delineated above. Data on expenditure and consumption come from the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD Health 
Statistics). National regulatory documents as well as published and grey 
literature were used to identify and explore relevant strategies at national level 
as well as current practice regarding international price comparisons. Previous 
publications of the European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, 
particularly in this series, were identified for each included country. Country-
specific information was summarized in tables and sent to appropriate country 
experts from the authors’ networks for review.
Results are presented thematically in chapters. Each chapter begins with 
a brief summary of relevant contextual information. Country results are 
then presented as a concise synthesis; selected interesting examples from 
specific countries are used for further illustration where appropriate. Detailed 
information per country is presented in abstracted tables per section. Each 
chapter ends with a short statement on the influence of the financial crisis on 
related regulatory mechanisms.

2. The context of pharm
aceutical care 
2. The context of pharmaceutical care – 
expenditure and consumption data
2.1 Expenditure
There are three complementary approaches to quantifying pharmaceutical expenditure that lend themselves especially well to international comparisons: 1) pharmaceutical expenditure per capita (in monetary 
units); 2) pharmaceutical expenditure as a share of total health expenditure 
(THE); and 3) pharmaceutical expenditure as a share of gross domestic product 
(GDP). Overall, comparisons of health care expenditures across countries are 
not straightforward, not least due to differences in the structure and financing of 
the health systems and mode of cost calculation. Pharmaceutical expenditures 
in particular pose a number of substantial challenges (see Vogler & Martikainen, 
2016 and Chapter 9) and figures may vary depending on data source.
The following sections focus on expenditure for “retail” pharmaceuticals 
(both with and without prescription), i.e. those distributed through community 
pharmacies (or other authorized retail shops), as it is reported within the 
System of National Health Accounts (OECD, 2016a). This variable includes 
spending on other medical non-durable goods, adding approximately 5% to 
the expenditure on average (data differ considerably across countries and are 
sometimes incomplete), pharmacists’ remuneration when it is separate from 
the price of medicines, as well as wholesale and retail margins and value-
added tax if applicable. Additional considerations on expenditure for other 
pharmaceuticals, i.e. those distributed through hospitals, which are not included 
in this item, can be found at the end of this section.
Ad. 1) Per capita retail pharmaceutical expenditures, adjusted for purchasing 
power, among countries included in this study ranged from 324.6 (Denmark) 
to 741.1 US$ PPP (Germany) per capita in 2014 (see Figure 2.1). Ireland, 
France, Greece and Belgium were at the upper end of this spectrum below 
Germany, while the Netherlands, Portugal and Poland were at the lower end 
above Denmark. From a longitudinal perspective, while some countries show 
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a relatively stable upwards trend (for example, Austria, Germany and Poland), 
in others per capita expenditures on retail medicines have been decreasing (for 
example, Portugal as of 2009, and the Netherlands as of 2011). Following a 
stable upwards trend until 2009, available data for Greece during the financial 
crisis years show a dramatic decline in per capita expenditure after 2011. 
Fig. 2.1 
Per capita expenditure on “retail” pharmaceuticals and other medical non-durables (in 
US$ PPP), 2004–2014
Source: OECD, 2016a.
Varying per capita expenditures for pharmaceuticals among countries can be 
attributed to different consumption rates (for example, for different indication 
areas, see section on consumption below) – the so-called volume component – 
differences in the utilization of new, mostly high-priced medicines and 
established, mostly low-priced medicines – the so-called structural component – 
and finally different prices per pharmaceutical – the so-called price component. 
Ad. 2) Pharmaceutical expenditure can also be viewed in relation to the 
total expenditure on health and expressed as a percentage. Among compared 
countries, retail pharmaceutical expenditure as a share of current1 expenditure 
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in the consideration of pharmaceutical costs.
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on health in 2014 amounted to 14.5% on average with a median of 14.1% and a 
range of 6.7% (in Denmark) to 28.4% (in Greece). Overall, retail pharmaceutical 
expenditure as a share of current expenditure on health shows relative stability 
both in directionality and positioning among compared countries (see Fig. 2.2) 
and has declined on average since 2004 (average excluding the Netherlands and 
the United Kingdom 18.1%, median 17.0%). A higher ranking here compared 
with the per capita observations in Fig. 2.1 (for example, Poland, Portugal) could 
mean that either pharmaceutical consumption is above average compared to 
other health services or that price levels are higher compared to other areas of 
care, which are mainly shaped by personnel costs. Conversely, a substantially 
lower rank (for example, Austria, Sweden) may indicate lower pharmaceutical 
consumption or prices. 
Fig. 2.2
Expenditure on “retail” pharmaceuticals and other medical non-durables as a share of 
current expenditure on health, 2004–2014
Source: OECD, 2016a.
Ad. 3) Finally, another approach towards assessing and contextualizing 
pharmaceutical expenditure is looking at its share in gross domestic product. 
In 2014 both the average and the median shares of retail pharmaceutical 
expenditure among compared countries lay at 1.4% – compared to 1.5% and 
1.6% respectively in 2004. Following outlier Greece (with 2.3%), France, Spain 
and Germany build the upper cluster in the sample with values between 1.60% 
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and 1.67%, while Denmark (0.71%) and the Netherlands (0.83%) are at the 
lowest end of the spectrum. Varying degrees of contraction in the GDP of 
compared countries following the financial crisis should be taken into account 
when interpreting these figures.
The relative stability of expenditure as a percentage of GDP in contrast to 
a falling percentage of current health expenditure can be explained by the fact 
that in many countries within the sample expenditure on other services and 
goods has increased at a speed above GDP growth, while expenditure on “retail” 
pharmaceuticals has grown in line with GDP. Another contributing factor may 
be the availability of generic products following patent expiry of originator 
medicines.
Pharmaceutical expenditure as a share of GDP (shown in Fig. 2.3) emerges as 
a direct multiplication of current health expenditure as a share of GDP (Fig. 2.4) 
and the share of current health expenditure spent on “retail” pharmaceuticals 
(Fig. 2.2). In 2014 current expenditure on health amounted to an average of 
9.0% of GDP in OECD countries and 9.8% among studied countries (median 
10.1%), up from 8.4% and 8.3% respectively in 2004. Sweden led the sample 
in 2014 with 11.2%, followed by France and Germany with 11.1% and 11.0%, 
respectively. For the majority of countries in the sample a clear upwards trend 
can be discerned until 2009, with levelling off or declining tendencies after 
that. As of 2010, current expenditure as a share of GDP (including both public 
and private spending) has increased again for a number of countries, albeit 
seemingly at a slower pace. 
Another perspective for consideration results from looking at public 
expenditure on pharmaceuticals only. In this context, the term “public” denotes 
costs which are carried by the publicly financed (statutory) health system – 
i.e. tax-financed or insurance-based – and not by the patients themselves 
(out-of-pocket) or by private insurance. Out-of-pocket (OOP) payments for 
pharmaceuticals may be required because
1. some parts of the population are not covered by the publicly financed 
(statutory) health system (for example, because they are covered as 
subsidiaries in a private insurance scheme);
2. patients are covered by the publicly financed (statutory) health system, but 
certain medicines are not included in the benefit basket; and/or
3. pharmaceuticals are included in the benefit basket but are not fully 
reimbursed, thus requiring patient cost-sharing (see Chapter 6). 
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Fig. 2.3
Expenditure on “retail” pharmaceuticals and other medical non-durables as a share of 
GDP, 2004–2014
Source: OECD, 2016a.
Fig. 2.4
Current health expenditure as a share of GDP, 2004–2014
Source: OECD, 2016a: Note: the spike in the Swedish figures between 2010 and 2011 is attributable to a change in the 
calculation of long-term care expenditure.
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Following the same logic as for total pharmaceutical expenditure above, 
we first look at per capita spending and then at its relative share within 
pharmaceutical expenditure. Among studied countries, public per capita 
expenditure on pharmaceuticals in 2014 (Fig. 2.5 in analogy to Fig. 2.1) ranged 
between 113.6 US$ PPP in Poland and 617.5 in Germany. Ireland’s public per 
capita expenditure was second highest at 491.0 US$ PPP with a difference of 
approximately 125 US$ PPP to Germany, a value which would be even higher 
if only the statutorily insured population (89%) were considered. At the other 
end of the spectrum, Denmark had the second lowest public pharmaceutical 
expenditure with 144.1 US$ PPP per capita and a difference of approximately 
70 US$ PPP to the next country (Portugal). In the Netherlands, statutory and 
private sickness funds were merged into a single system in 2006, which is 
considered statutory despite the fact that sickness funds are governed by private 
law. Differences in data between 2005 and 2006 need to be interpreted taking 
into account that many individuals were regarded (and counted) as privately 
insured before this change. 
Fig. 2.5
Public per capita expenditure on “retail” pharmaceuticals and other medical non-
durables (in US$ PPP), 2004–2014
Source: OECD, 2016a.
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In 2014 public pharmaceutical expenditure as a share of total pharmaceutical 
expenditure (Fig. 2.6) in compared countries ranged between a low of 33.5% 
in Poland and a high of 83.3% in Germany. The Netherlands and France also 
showed values above 70%. At the other end of the spectrum, Denmark remained 
below 50% following decreasing trends since 2010, while Greece demonstrates 
a constant steep recline starting in 2011. The same caveats as above apply for 
Germany and the Netherlands; in the case of Germany, the percentages would 
be even higher if only the statutorily insured were considered.
Fig. 2.6
Public expenditure as a share of total pharmaceutical expenditure on “retail” 
pharmaceuticals and other medical non-durables, 2004–2014
Source: OECD, 2016a.
Public expenditure on ‘retail’ pharmaceuticals – both per capita and as a 
share of current health expenditure – decreased or stabilized in the context of 
the economic crisis, as can be seen in Figs 2.5 and 2.6. Additional comparative 
visualizations (public expenditure on pharmaceuticals as a share of GDP; 
private expenditure on pharmaceuticals as a share of GDP; public expenditure 
on pharmaceuticals as a share of current expenditure on health; private 
expenditure on pharmaceuticals as a share of current expenditure on health; 
private per capita expenditure on pharmaceuticals) can be found in Annex I. 
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As mentioned early on in this chapter, it is important to note that the above 
figures depict expenditure in the retail or outpatient market only. Within the 
System of National Health Accounts, inpatient pharmaceutical expenditure 
is a memorandum item that is optional to report; structural challenges make 
it difficult for some countries to collect and/or disaggregate information on 
pharmaceutical costs in hospitals and other health care facilities. In the newest 
iteration of Health at a Glance, the OECD reports that – depending on budgetary 
and distributional characteristics and possibly dispensation practices – inpatient 
expenditure on pharmaceuticals would add approximately 10% on top of retail 
spending for some countries (for example, Germany in our sample), but this 
share could be far more substantial in others (for example, 27% in Spain and 
an estimated 44% in Portugal; OECD, 2015). Further OECD research found 
that pharmaceutical spending in hospitals has increased over time (in countries 
where information is available), attributable both to the proliferation of specialty 
drugs which are more likely to be used in the inpatient setting and to the fact that 
cost-containment measures have mainly focused on the retail market (Belloni, 
Morgan & Paris, 2016). For example, based on official statistics from Denmark, 
pharmaceutical turnover in the hospital sector in 2014 amounted to 9.6 billion 
DKK compared to 11.8 billion DKK in the primary care sector (from 7.6 and 13.6 
billion DKK respectively in 2010; DHDA, 2016). This information is important 
to consider when interpreting Denmark’s positioning in the comparative 
figures shown above. At the same time hospital pharmaceutical expenditure 
may not strictly portray costs for medicines consumed by inpatients: in several 
countries certain medicines may only be obtainable at a hospital pharmacy for 
outpatients as well (see Chapter 5). In Italy, many new drugs (for example for 
Hepatitis C and diabetes) to be used by inpatients and dispensed to outpatients 
at hospitals are procured by health authorities and are thus not counted into 
the retail market; drugs procured by health authorities account for 33% of the 
total pharmaceutical market and 49% of drugs covered by the National Health 
Service (Jommi & Minghetti, 2015). The extent of this phenomenon should 
also be taken into account when considering the ratio between pharmaceutical 
expenditures in the retail and inpatient sectors.
2.2 Consumption
In each country consumption volumes and structures can be influenced by a 
variety of factors, such as burden of disease and regulatory requirements, as 
well as prescribing traditions and guidelines. Differences in culture and patient 
attitudes may also contribute to variation in consumption patterns. Therefore, 
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this section does not attempt to explore causal relationships in individual 
countries in the sample. The goal is rather to provide a general overview of 
pharmaceutical consumption trends in compared countries, focusing on 
common indications, particularly chronic conditions (diabetes, hypertension, 
dyslipidaemia and depression). Demographic change has led to an overall 
increase in pharmaceutical prescriptions for chronic and/or age-related 
conditions, which, however, may still be underdiagnosed and/or undertreated 
in some countries. 
The following paragraphs provide condition-specific insights and explore 
potential contributing factors beyond the ones mentioned above. Consumption 
data for some countries in the sample are not available from the OECD as 
they are not supplied by national authorities. For some countries, reported 
data include pharmaceuticals dispensed in hospitals and/or non-reimbursed 
pharmaceuticals and/or OTC pharmaceuticals, while for others these categories 
are excluded (OECD, 2016b). 
Prescriptions for antidiabetic drugs have shown a more or less stable 
increasing trend in all countries for which information was available, with the 
exception of Spain and Portugal during the crisis years. This is in all likelihood 
at least partially attributable to the increase in obesity rates observed in most 
countries; the availability of insulin analogues may also play a role. Finland, 
Germany, Greece and the United Kingdom show the highest consumption rates 
among countries in Fig. 2.7, Austria by far the lowest. 
A similar pattern can be observed for medications used against hypertension 
(Fig. 2.8; as suggested by the OECD, this variable aggregates figures on 
antihypertensives, diuretics, beta-blocking agents, calcium channel blockers 
and agents acting on the renin-angiotensin system; OECD, 2015). Germany has 
traditionally shown a much higher consumption rate than comparator countries, 
reaching more than three times that of Austria and 1.4 times that of Finland 
(the second highest) in 2014. 
In contrast, the United Kingdom has continuously demonstrated the 
highest consumption rate regarding lipid modifying agents, followed closely 
by Belgium and Denmark. Austria and Germany are at the lower end of the 
consumption spectrum (Fig. 2.9). The consumption of antidepressants shows a 
relatively stable, slowly increasing trend in the majority of compared countries 
with Portugal, Sweden and the United Kingdom building the upper cluster and 
Italy, the Netherlands and Greece demonstrating the lowest values (Fig. 2.10). 
Prescription patterns for lipid modifying agents are influenced by the general 
increase in obesity rates and a wider implementation of relevant screening, 
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Fig. 2.7
Antidiabetic medication (defined daily doses per 1000 inhabitants per day), 2004–
2014
Source: OECD, 2016a.
Fig. 2.8
Medications against hypertension (defined daily doses per 1000 inhabitants per day), 
2004–2014
Source: OECD, 2016a.
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
550
600
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Austria Belgium Denmark Finland
France Germany Greece Ireland
Italy Netherlands Poland Portugal
Spain Sweden United Kingdom
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Austria Belgium Denmark Finland
France Germany Greece Italy
Netherlands Portugal Spain Sweden
United Kingdom
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Finland
Greece
Germany
United 
Kingdom
Netherlands
Spain
Belgium
Italy
Portugal
Sweden
France
Denmark
Austria
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Germany
Finland
Denmark
Italy
United 
Kingdom
Sweden
Belgium
Netherlands 
Greece
Spain
France
Portugal
Austria
Health systems in transition  Pharmaceutical regulation in 15 European countries 15
as well as a trend towards earlier treatment and higher dosages. Indication 
extensions and prolonged treatment protocols may additionally influence the 
consumption of antidepressants; unmet need and appropriateness of prescribed 
treatment need to be considered in countries with very low and very high 
antidepressant consumption rates, respectively (OECD, 2015).
Fig. 2.9
Lipid modifying agents (defined daily doses per 1000 inhabitants per day), 2004–2014
Source: OECD, 2016a.
The consumption of antibiotics in primary care can be used as a quality 
indicator; this reflects its link to antimicrobial resistance: the higher the number 
of prescriptions, the higher the prevalence of resistant strains. Culturally 
determined patient expectations, prescriber incentives for (ir)rational pharmaco-
therapy as well as regulatory issues (for example, the possibility of obtaining 
antibiotics over the counter, as was the case in Greece) can have a strong 
influence on consumption patterns. In 2014 Italy, France and Belgium had the 
highest consumption rates in the sample, while the Netherlands, Sweden and 
Germany occupied the other end of the spectrum (Fig. 2.11). Greece’s extremely 
high and rising values until 2008 show a considerable decline in the period until 
2011 (even below the 2004 figure).
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Fig. 2.10
Antidepressants (defined daily doses per 1000 inhabitants per day), 2004–2014
Source: OECD, 2016a.
Fig. 2.11
Antibiotics for systemic use (defined daily doses per 1000 inhabitants per day), 
2004–2014 
Source: OECD, 2016c.
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pricing
As a rule, marketing authorization is a fundamental requirement that needs to be fulfilled before medicines can be made available and any decision-making on pricing or reimbursement can take place, and is 
thus traditionally the first regulatory step in the pharmaceutical market. The 
marketing authorization process aims to verify the quality, safety and efficacy 
of candidate products and is carried out by competent authorities at national or 
European level. To apply for marketing authorization in Europe, manufacturers 
are required to submit the necessary evidence and have the choice between 
three options:
1. in the national authorization procedure, the application is submitted for 
one country only; the national competent authority is responsible for 
reviewing submitted evidence; 
2. in the centralized authorization procedure, the application concerns 
the entire European Economic Area and is submitted to the European 
Medicines Agency for review. The centralized procedure is compulsory 
for medicines with new active substances for the treatment of cancer, 
diabetes, neurodegenerative diseases, autoimmune and other immune 
dysfunctions, and viral diseases. Furthermore, it is required for medicines 
derived from biotechnology processes, such as genetic engineering, and 
advanced therapy medicines, such as gene-therapy, somatic cell-therapy or 
tissue-engineered medicines, as well as for orphan medicines (medicines 
for rare diseases) and veterinary medicines for use as growth or yield 
enhancers. While the centralized authorization procedure is optional 
for medicines containing new active substances for other indications, 
according to the EMA “the great majority of new, innovative medicines 
pass through the centralized authorization procedure in order to be 
marketed in the EU” (EMA, 2016);
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3. to apply for authorization in more than one EU country at the same time, 
two pathways are possible: i) the mutual recognition procedure, which 
presupposes an existing national authorization and uses that national 
competent authority as a reference point responsible for the evidence 
report, and ii) the decentralized procedure, wherein authorizations in 
several countries are requested at once and the manufacturers can freely 
choose which country’s competent authority will be the one responsible 
for reviewing the evidence. 
Safety is the main criterion for marketing authorization. A limited proof 
of efficacy based on small sample sizes is usually sufficient. Submitted 
evidence consists of randomized controlled trials (RCTs) carried out under 
optimized study conditions, usually comparing the pharmaceutical in question 
to a placebo (and not an active comparator) and reporting clinical (surrogate) 
outcome measures. Thus, it is clear that obtaining marketing authorization does 
not necessitate that the pharmaceutical provides a therapeutic benefit that is 
meaningful to patients in real world conditions.
Patient-relevant benefit is examined during post-marketing evaluations, 
which have been established in the majority of studied countries. As a rule, the 
focus is on a pharmaceutical’s added therapeutic benefit compared to existing 
alternatives. Cost-effectiveness and budget impact are further important aspects, 
which are, however, not evaluated in all countries at this point. Post-marketing 
evaluations usually serve to determine the reimbursement eligibility and/
or price of (new) pharmaceuticals in the publicly financed (statutory) health 
system. Despite the fact that such evaluations at national level are the norm, 
they vary considerably both in process and methodology across countries (see 
Chapter 5, Annex II and Allen et al., 2013). Leaving aside these differences, two 
simplified archetypes of post-marketing evaluation are discernible in Europe 
(see Figs 3.1 and 3.2):
a. evaluation at a predetermined price: the price is set in advance, either 
directly by the manufacturer or in agreement/following negotiations with 
competent authorities; reimbursement eligibility is determined for this 
price (cost-effectiveness analysis); and
b. evaluation without a predetermined price: the ascertained (added) benefit 
of the pharmaceutical in question functions as a basis to determine 
reimbursement eligibility and/or (maximum) reimbursement price.
Health systems in transition  Pharmaceutical regulation in 15 European countries 19
Fig. 3.1
The two simplified archetypes of post-marketing evaluation
Source: Based on Zentner & Busse, 2011.
As can be seen in Table 3.1, post-marketing evaluations on the basis of a 
predetermined price (type A) are more prevalent among comparator countries. 
However, not all these countries follow the same approach in setting prices. In 
Sweden, prices are proposed by the manufacturers and were traditionally not 
discussed further, although negotiations have been introduced in recent years. 
The United Kingdom employs a broader agreement between the national payer 
(Department of Health) and manufacturers, the so-called Pharmaceutical Price 
Regulation Scheme (PPRS). The PPRS is essentially a profit control system: 
companies can set their own prices as long as the profit levels do not exceed 
the threshold. In contrast, ministries in the Netherlands and Poland have the 
final say in setting prices, taking manufacturer suggestions into consideration. 
In Austria, ex-factory prices are set by the ministry based on legal provisions, 
while reimbursement prices are negotiated between social insurance and the 
manufacturers. In Italy, price and reimbursement are negotiated simultaneously 
between manufacturers and the Italian Medicines Agency (AIFA).
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Fig. 3.2
The link between marketing authorization, post-marketing evaluation and price
Source: Panteli et al., 2015.
Belgium, France and Germany evaluate the (added) benefit of newly 
authorized pharmaceuticals independently and base setting reimbursement 
prices or amounts on relevant results. Important differences exist within 
this group as well: while potential price negotiations take place once the 
evaluation has been completed in both France and Germany, the Belgian 
Ministry of Economic Affairs sets maximum prices during the evaluation 
process, and the reimbursement price (i.e. the actual price that forms the 
basis for reimbursement) is negotiated during the evaluation process by the 
Pharmaceutical Reimbursement Committee at the National Institute for Health 
and Disability Insurance.2 Value-based pricing is discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 4.
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2. If no agreement is reached, the company can still negotiate with the Minister towards establishing a risk-sharing agreement (e.g. 
price-volume, budget cap), which remains confidential.
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Table 3.1
Patient access following marketing authorization and relation to post-marketing 
evaluation (PME), 2016
Country Availability of pharmaceuticals for patients in 
the statutory health system following 
marketing authorization
Link between pricing and post-marketing 
evaluation
Austria Only after PME With predetermined price
Belgium Only after PME Without predetermined price
Denmark Only after PME With predetermined price
Finland Only after PME With predetermined price
France Only after PME Without predetermined price (price is set based 
on added therapeutic benefit (ASMR))
Germany Directly Without predetermined price 
Greece Only after reimbursement approval With predetermined price
Ireland Only after PME With predetermined price (may be adjusted in 
negotiations following PME)
Italy Only after PME With predetermined price
Netherlands Only after PME With predetermined (maximum) price
Poland Only after PME With predetermined price
Portugal Only after PME With predetermined price
Spain Only after PME Without predetermined price (processes run in 
parallel)
Sweden Only after PME With predetermined price
United Kingdom Directly With predetermined price
Source: Authors’ compilation.
The Transparency Directive issued by the European Commission (Directive 
89/105/EEC) stipulates that decisions pertaining to the reimbursement or pricing 
of pharmaceuticals have to be taken within 90 days of marketing authorization 
(180 days for processes integrating reimbursement and pricing). In reality there 
are often substantially longer delays until patients have access to reimbursed 
medicines, which are in all likelihood partially attributable to the decision-
making process. However, additional elements may also play a role; for example, 
manufacturers may strategically delay market launches in specific countries to 
preclude influencing prices in other countries using external reference pricing 
(see Chapter 4; Bouvy & Vogler, 2013). 
In all countries in this study, pharmaceuticals are in principle available 
once marketing authorization has been granted; however, patients are usually 
expected to carry the costs themselves while the post-marketing evaluation 
is in progress. Germany and the United Kingdom are exceptions to this rule: 
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pharmaceuticals are theoretically reimbursed in the publicly financed (statutory) 
health care system as soon as marketing authorization has been granted, that is 
before the post-marketing evaluation is completed. In all other countries in the 
sample, actual patient access to newly authorized medicines could be expected 
to show at least some delay. 
In France, there is only one situation wherein reimbursement can be granted 
before the post-marketing evaluation has been carried out. Highly innovative 
medicines without therapeutic alternatives already on the market can be made 
accessible even before marketing authorization. Within this early access scheme, 
called “Autorisation Temporaire d’Utilisation”, prices are set freely. These 
medicines continue to be reimbursed after marketing authorization and during 
the post-marketing evaluation phase until a price agreement is reached with 
the manufacturer. If the agreed price is lower than the price initially charged, 
manufacturers have to pay back the difference. In Italy, provisional agreements 
for access may be agreed at the regional level before the centralized pricing 
and reimbursement negotiations are concluded; in Austria, pharmaceuticals 
under evaluation can be made available in exceptional cases following an 
ex-ante approval of the respective sickness fund’s Chief Medical Officer (“head 
physician”). 
To measure the delay between market entry of pharmaceuticals and patient 
access, the European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations 
(EFPIA) developed the W.A.I.T. indicator, which captures the time elapsed 
between the day marketing authorization was granted by the EMA and the 
end (official last day) of the administrative process in the post-marketing stage. 
The latest measurement in 2011 encompassed 20 European countries and found 
that the timeframe between market entry and the end of the post-marketing 
evaluation ranged between 116 and 550 days (EFPIA, 2011). Germany and 
the United Kingdom are not included in this calculation, as pharmaceuticals 
are theoretically available once marketing authorization has been granted 
(see above). Furthermore, the indicator does not consider the inpatient sector, 
where a faster availability could be expected in several countries. For example, 
it has been reported that some manufacturers in Austria do not apply for 
reimbursement in the outpatient setting (i.e. inclusion to the positive list, see 
chapter 5) as medicines administered in hospitals are not subject to price 
regulations and are paid out of the hospital budget. This contributes to fast 
market access for some medicines (e.g. oncology medicines), but can in fact 
increase public pharmaceutical expenditure overall.
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The corresponding variable “time to market” developed by the IMS 
Consulting Group uses the same starting point but a different terminus: this 
is the month during which overall sales surpass a threshold that could be 
attributed to stocking alone (defined as 1% of the maximal sales in the first 24 
months after market entry). Comparative data for the years 2007–2011 for all 
countries included in this study are shown in Fig. 3.3. 
Fig. 3.3
IMS Consulting Group’s Time To Market in months, 2007–2011
Source: Authors’ compilation based on data from IMS, 2012.
With an average of about two months, Germany continuously demonstrated 
the lowest values and thus the fastest access to newly authorized medicines. 
Austria, Denmark, Finland and Sweden showed average values of four to five 
months and were continuously below the overall average of approximately 
eight months. Based on this data, delays can be observed for the United 
Kingdom, which showed average values comparable to those of Austria and 
Sweden, despite its theoretical direct access following marketing authorization 
(see above). According to experts, this phenomenon can be attributed to an 
uncertainty-fuelled reluctance on the part of relevant payers in the health 
system (“Clinical Commissioning Groups” in England and “NHS Boards” in 
Scotland) to include newly authorized medicines in their formularies before 
seeing post-marketing evaluation results. The longest average times to market 
surpassed 12 months and were found in Italy and Portugal, followed by Belgium 
at 11 months. 
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Fig. 3.4 plots time to market (i.e. date of marketing authorization to benchmark 
sales volume) against availability of EMA-authorized pharmaceuticals in 
studied countries for a given time period (IMS, 2012). According to these 
figures, German patients had both the fastest and the most comprehensive 
access to new pharmaceuticals, followed by patients in the United Kingdom 
and Denmark. In the first data series (diamonds), only those pharmaceuticals 
are considered that were actually available on the market within 24 months of 
marketing authorization (see the definition of the “time-to-market” variable 
above). While a negative linear correlation can be observed for the majority 
of countries, meaning that those with the longest time to market also have the 
lowest availability, there are also remarkable exceptions: Spain demonstrates a 
relatively long time to market but also very high availability (above 80%). And 
while Ireland demonstrates a much faster access than Italy (7 months compared 
to 13), availability in Italy is almost 10 percentage points higher.
Fig. 3.4
Average time to market and availability of EMA-authorized medicines between 2006 
and 2011
Source: Authors’ compilation based on data from IMS, 2012.
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If one also includes medicines for which the time between marketing 
authorization and market entry surpassed 24 months and subsequently considers 
availability at the end of the observation period (squares), the position of most 
countries on the diagram changes. However, the situation remains relatively 
stable for Denmark, Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom (which means 
that there are practically no additional products entering the market with a delay 
of more than 24 months). Availability increases for all remaining countries 
but different patterns are discernible. In both Italy and Sweden, average time 
to market rises by approximately two months but availability increases by 
11 compared to 5 percentage points, respectively. While availability jumps 
from 37% to 64% in Portugal, time to market also goes up by 10 months to an 
average of 22 months. Thus, Germany remains the front-runner in both speed 
and availability of newly authorized medicines even when outliers are taken 
into account. 
Cross-sectional IMS data for 2014 do not show any dramatic changes in 
the patterns described above. While Germany retains first place in both speed 
of access (3.5 months) and availability, Spain demonstrates higher availability 
than Sweden and the United Kingdom but a considerably longer time to market 
(15.8 months) compared to Fig. 3.3. Time to market in Greece seems also to 
have increased substantially, reaching 21.3 months on average, due perhaps 
to increased effectiveness considerations introduced as a response to the 
financial crisis and related efforts to constrain public expenditure. The same 
IMS report argues that differences in time to market disappear if the duration 
of post-marketing evaluations (i.e. “time to reimbursement decision”) is also 
considered. While this is numerically correct, it needs careful interpretation 
that takes into account different practices regarding availability during 
post-marketing evaluations (see above). Furthermore, the interpretation of time 
to market data should also take into account that manufacturers can determine 
how quickly after marketing authorization they apply for reimbursement and – 
depending on the system – have the option of suspending the evaluation process 
once it has begun.
To facilitate timely access to innovative medicines, the EMA has been 
piloting the concept of adaptive pathways. These encompass an iterative process 
starting with marketing authorization for a restricted population at an earlier 
stage during pharmaceutical development with the potential of progressive 
expansion following evidence generation, incorporation of real world evidence 
and stakeholder input. While adaptive pathways are considered a promising 
approach, particularly for unmet need (i.e. indications without a therapeutic 
alternative), concerns on the part of regulators and the health technology 
assessment (HTA) community focus on safety considerations – which are more 
pronounced the lower evidence requirements for marketing authorization are 
set – in conjunction with the fact that many countries do not have delisting 
mechanisms which are sufficiently equipped to deal with pharmaceuticals that 
end up falling short of their value targets (Eichler et al., 2015; Macaulay, 2015; 
Joppi et al., 2016). 
4. Pricing m
echanism
s in publicly  
financed (statutory) health system
s
4. Pricing mechanisms in publicly 
financed (statutory) health systems
Price regulation applies to different points in the pharmaceutical distribution chain, starting with the determination of manufacturer prices, down to wholesaler and pharmacist remuneration margins and 
product taxation. How detailed and stringent this regulation is varies both 
across countries and between sectors in the same country. In the inpatient 
sector, direct negotiations between hospitals and manufacturers or wholesalers 
are usually possible. In contrast, price-setting and distribution margins are 
more strictly regulated in ambulatory care. 
Manufacturer prices are subject to legal or regulatory specifications in the 
majority of countries included in this study. So-called “free pricing” countries, 
such as Denmark, Germany and the United Kingdom, are in the minority. Even 
when manufacturers are free to set their own prices, these are influenced by 
indirect measures (for example, internal reference pricing, parallel imports, 
legally enforced discounts and rebates, as well as individual contract agreements 
between payers and manufacturers). In Germany, free pricing was restricted 
following the AMNOG regulation introduced in 2011: for pharmaceuticals with 
a new active substance or an indication extension entering the market, free 
pricing only applies for the first year after marketing authorization. After that, 
only a negotiated reimbursement amount is paid for drugs with proven added 
therapeutic benefit (for both statutorily and privately insured patients), while a 
maximum reimbursement amount is set for drugs without added benefit based 
on internal reference pricing (applies to statutorily insured only). 
Table 4.1 presents an overview of mechanisms used to determine (initial) 
manufacturer prices in studied countries. The individual strategies will be more 
closely examined in the subsequent paragraphs, followed by insights on price 
revisions and the role of value added tax (VAT).
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Table 4.1
Overview of pricing strategies applied in 15 countries, 2016
Pricing mechanisms
Country Free pricing* External 
reference 
pricing
Internal 
reference 
pricing
Elements of 
value-based 
pricing 
Other
Austria No Yes No** No -
Belgium No Yes Yes Yes (value-based 
premium)
Negotiations
Denmark Yes No Yes No Competition 
(retail)  
Tendering 
(hospitals)
Finland No Yes Yes No Negotiations 
Tendering
France No Yes (for ASMR I, 
II, or III)
Yes Yes Negotiations
Germany Yes (AMNOG: 
new active 
substances, first 
year only)
Yes (as a 
secondary 
criterion during 
price 
negotiations for 
drugs with added 
benefit)
Yes 
(“Festbeträge”)
Yes (AMNOG) -
Greece No Yes Yes No -
Ireland No Yes Yes For specific 
products (patient 
acess schemes)
Negotiations
Italy No Yes Yes Yes Negotiations 
(performance-
based)
Netherlands No Yes Yes No Negotiations (for 
high-cost orphan 
drugs, 
confidential)
Poland No Yes Yes Yes Negotiations
Portugal No Yes Yes No Online auctions 
to set maximum 
price (inpatient 
sector, SPMS)
Spain No Yes Yes No -
Sweden No No Yes Yes Tendering
United Kingdom Yes (see last 
column)
No No For specific 
products (patient 
access schemes)
Negotiations 
Profit margins 
(PPRS)
Source: Authors’ compilation.  
Notes: * as mentioned in the text, manufacturers may be able to set their own prices in the inpatient sector even if free 
pricing is not applicable in the centralized pricing policy (e.g. Austria).  
** internal reference pricing as described in the text below does not take place in Austria, however, there is a generic 
price link system (generic prices are set in relation to the prices of the originator product).
.
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One of the most frequently employed strategies in price regulation is 
external reference pricing (ERP; also known as external price referencing or 
international reference pricing). It has been established in almost all European 
countries either as a main or secondary criterion for determining pharmaceutical 
prices (see Fig. 4.1). As a rule, ERP is applied for reimbursable, patented 
medicines but the exact characteristics of the strategy vary substantially across 
studied countries (see Table 4.2). The number of countries used as references 
(i.e. included in each country’s ERP “country basket”) ranges from three in 
Portugal to 30 in Poland. While the average of all prices in the basket is used as 
a benchmark in most cases, Spain uses the lowest price and Greece the average 
of the three lowest prices in their respective country baskets, while Portugal 
follows different calculation methods depending on the sector. The majority 
of countries in the sample uses manufacturer prices for ERP, but Finland 
uses wholesale prices and the Netherlands pharmacy retail prices. France 
is the most frequently referenced country in the sample (by 20 countries in 
Europe), followed by Belgium, Denmark and Spain (by 18 countries). Even in 
Sweden, traditionally one of the notable exceptions not using ERP, the Dental 
and Pharmaceutical Benefits Agency (TLV) was newly tasked with monitoring 
international prices to ensure that prices in Sweden are not excessive. 
Fig. 4.1
Use of reference pricing in European countries, 2016
Source: Authors’ compilation based on Toumi et al., 2014 and Vogler et al., 2015.
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Table 4.2
Characteristics of ERP mechanisms in studied countries, 2016
Country Scope of ERP Number of 
reference 
countries
Reference 
countries
Calculation 
method
Referenced by 
number of 
countries
Austria Reimbursable 
outpatient 
medicines
27 EU-member 
countries
Average of all 
countries
16
Belgium Outpatient 
medicines
27 EU-member 
countries
Average of all 
countries (not 
explicitly)
18
Denmark Not applicable, see Table 4.1 18
Finland Reimbursable 
medicines 
(outpatient)
29 EU-member 
countries, IS, NO
Not fixed 15
France Reimbursable 
medicines 
(outpatient) and 
some inpatient 
medicines (not 
financed through 
the DRG-system, 
so-called “liste 
en sus”)
4 DE, ES, IT, UK Not specified 
(“prices similar 
to reference 
countries and not 
lower than the 
lowest price”)
20
Germany Reimbursable 
prescription 
medicines with 
added benefit 
(outpatient)
15 AT, BE, CZ, DK, 
ES, FI, FR, GR, 
IE, IT, NL, PT, SE, 
SK, UK
Weighted based 
on market size 
and purchasing 
power parity
16
Greece Reimbursable 
medicines 
(outpatient and 
inpatient)
27 EU-member 
countries
Average of three 
lowest prices
14
Ireland Reimbursable 
medicines 
(outpatient and 
inpatient)
9 AT, BE, DE, DK, 
ES, FI, FR, NL, 
UK
Average of all 
countries
13
Italy Reimbursable 
medicines 
(outpatient and 
inpatient)
24 AT, BE, CY, CZ, 
DK, EE, ES, FR, 
GR, HU, IE, IS, 
LI, LT, LV, NL, 
NO, PL, PT, RO, 
SE, SI, SK, UK
Not fixed 17
Netherlands Outpatient and 
inpatient 
medicines
4 BE, DE, FR, UK Average of all 
countries
15
Poland Outpatient and 
inpatient 
medicines
30 EU countries, 
CH, IS, NO
Not fixed 12
Portugal Reimbursable 
prescription and 
OTC medicines 
(outpatient)
3 ES, FR, SK Outpatient: 
country average 
Inpatient: lowest 
price
15
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Country Scope of ERP Number of 
reference 
countries
Reference 
countries
Calculation 
method
Referenced by 
number of 
countries
Spain Reimbursable 
prescription 
medicines 
(outpatient)
16 AT, BE, CY, DE, 
EE, FI, FR, GR, 
IE, IT, LU, MT, 
NL, PT, SI, SK
Lowest price 18
Sweden Not applicable 14
United Kingdom Not applicable 17
Source: Authors’ compilation.
The prices considered can substantially influence the strategy’s effects. All 
countries use publicly available price information which does not incorporate 
confidential discounts and rebates negotiated between payers and manufacturers. 
Thus, referenced (list) prices often do not reflect reality and there is a risk of 
overpaying (see also Vogler et al., 2015). Furthermore, package sizes and dose 
strengths are not necessarily identical in all countries included in a referencing 
basket, a fact which further complicates arriving at representative results (see 
Chapter 9). 
In France, international comparators are used in the price negotiations for 
pharmaceuticals with major, important or moderate added benefit (see Annex 
II). Proven added value in Belgium can lead to a mark-up (premium) on the 
ERP-determined price. Similarly to France, the German Federal Association 
of Sickness Funds considers European prices as a secondary criterion in their 
negotiations with manufacturers towards setting reimbursement amounts for 
pharmaceuticals with proven added benefit. Germany is also the only country 
in the study where reference prices are weighted according to the country’s 
market size and purchasing power parity. 
A simulation of the development of pharmaceutical prices in an ERP 
context showed that the strategy can drive down prices in the long term (15% 
reduction in 10 years) if it is applied as the sole mechanism of price regulation 
(Toumi et al., 2014). Substantial price differences (>30%) between countries 
remained unchanged over the same time period. More frequent price revisions 
and comprehensive country baskets led to higher price reductions. The study’s 
overall conclusion was that real world price development led to more substantial 
reductions compared to the simulation assuming ERP as the sole determining 
mechanism; as such, it seems that other measures make a considerable 
contribution to lowering prices over time. This work confirmed earlier results, 
which supported a weighted referencing approach and the exclusion of all 
countries using ERP from other ERP baskets to avoid manufacturers’ strategic 
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market launches as well as spillover effects (Stargardt & Schreyögg, 2006). The 
latter recommendation would be difficult to implement in the European context 
given the widespread use of ERP (see above). A newer study concluded that 
ERP can negatively impact patient access, both by fuelling strategic launches 
and by hampering a potential willingness on behalf of manufacturers to accept 
lower pricing in lower-priced countries. Regarding EPR’s cost-containment 
function, the study’s authors suggest that frequent price revisions and the 
consideration of actual as opposed to list prices would lead to more substantial 
reductions (Vogler et al., 2015).
From the manufacturer’s perspective, EFPIA issued recommendations for 
the configuration of ERP processes with the aim of mitigating identified risks 
(no consideration of country-specific burden of disease and willingness to pay; 
potential for inhibiting access and innovation; spillover of structural problems). 
These include the integration of ERP into a wider pricing mechanism only for 
patented medicines eligible for reimbursement, the utilization of an adequate 
country basket encompassing five to seven economically comparable countries, 
the use of official manufacturer prices, a moderate frequency of price revisions 
(three years) and average prices as opposed to the lowest price(s) in the sample 
(EFPIA, 2014). With the exception of basket size, the German iteration of the 
strategy comes the closest to these recommendations among studied countries. 
Thirteen countries in this study also apply another referencing strategy, 
namely that of internal reference pricing (IRP; also known as internal 
price referencing or therapeutic reference pricing). Intended as both a 
cost-containment and a competition-stimulating measure, IRP is meant to 
determine pharmaceutical prices based on marketed equivalent or similar 
products within the country. Depending on the system, it is used to set 
reimbursement prices for product groups. Products are clustered according to 
active substance (for example, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal and Spain), pharmacological (rarely 
used) or therapeutic class (for example, Greece, Poland, Sweden). To determine 
maximum reimbursement amounts (“Festbeträge”) Germany uses an approach 
consisting of three grouping logics (“levels”), each corresponding to one of the 
aforementioned categorization modes. Pharmaceuticals with expired patents 
and their generics are grouped based on active substance (level 1). Several active 
substances are clustered together if they are pharmacologically/therapeutically 
comparable and chemically related (level 2). In the third level, pharmaceuticals 
with more than one active substance and chemically unrelated substances with 
comparable therapeutic effects are grouped together. The implementation of 
IRP started spreading in the last 25 years, with countries such as Denmark, 
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Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden paving the way. IRP is most commonly 
used for the pricing of generics (Bouvy & Vogler, 2013). However, in Italy 
IRP is also used as a basis for negotiations on the reimbursement prices of 
new medicines, in combination with ERP. A Cochrane review on the effects 
of pricing and purchasing policies on health outcomes and pharmaceutical 
utilization and expenditures found that IRP has the potential to shift use from 
medicines within the reference system that require cost-sharing to those at or 
below the reference price and thus reduce third-party expenditures in the short 
term; there is no reliable evidence on its effect on patient access and outcomes 
(Acosta et al., 2014). 
Value-based pricing has been gaining importance as an alternative strategy 
in recent years. However, there is no internationally recognized, single 
definition of “value” in this context – as a result, a variety of approaches can 
be understood as incorporating value-based elements (see Fig. 4.2). Paris and 
Belloni (2013) found this to be true for a sample of nine OECD countries; in 
narrower definitions, a process can only be considered value-based if it fully 
integrates reimbursement decisions and pricing. Sweden is considered a pioneer 
of the strategy in the European context: it has been applying a value-based 
approach incorporating a cost-effectiveness threshold since 2002. Among the 
countries in this study, France and Germany are two further prominent examples 
using demonstrable (added) benefit to determine prices for newly authorized 
pharmaceuticals (or indications). It is interesting to note that the concrete 
quantifications of value used in France and Germany (see Annex II) are not 
found in other countries incorporating value-based elements (for example, 
Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands). Value-based elements are not necessarily 
systematically implemented: in Italy, while proven added value can lead to a 
premium price (similar to Belgium, see above), this is not applied consistently 
for all pharmaceuticals. A new approach to value-based pricing for the United 
Kingdom was developed in 2014 but has not been implemented so far. 
One of the challenges facing value-based pricing manifests itself when the 
proven benefit of a medicine varies substantially between different indications 
and/or patient subgroups. For such cases, Claxton, Sculpher and Carrol suggest 
defining a unified price for the pharmaceutical in question, corresponding 
to the average of incremental cost-effectiveness ratios (Claxton, Sculpher & 
Carrol, 2011). Fig. 4.3 depicts different approaches: the uniform price, the 
volume-dependent price and a value-based approach based on differing benefit 
for patient subgroups; in the latter case the price would be comparatively low if 
the pharmaceutical is reimbursable for subgroups with lower benefit as well – 
but comparatively high if it is reimbursable for subgroups with a higher benefit.
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Fig. 4.2
Possible elements of value
Source: Authors’ compilation.
Fig. 4.3
Conceptual differences between traditional (uniform) pricing, volume-dependent 
pricing and value-based pricing 
Source: Authors’ compilation.
Price
Target population
(market size)
Price
Sales volume
Price
Patient subgroups
(declining effectiveness)
SG1 SG2 SG3
Traditional (uniform)
price
Volume-dependent price Value-based price
Economic
considerations
- Cost-effectiveness
- Budget Impact
- Financial protection
Unmet need/treatment
alternatives
Severity of condition
Burden of disease
Public health interest
Therapeutic
benefit
(↑gain, 
↓harm)
Innovativeness
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Despite their widespread use, current pricing policies are not without their 
limitations (see for example Pani et al. 2016). While external reference pricing 
may induce strategic launching or hamper lower pricing in countries with 
a lower ability to pay, setting prices based on value can also lead to patient 
access issues if companies decide to remove their products from the market 
due to unsatisfactory price levels. Among others, proposed alternatives include 
differential pricing (whereby an international agreement is met that enables 
manufacturers to charge different prices in different systems based on ability 
to pay, see Vogler et al., 2015) and so-called personalized reimbursement 
models, which would support differentiated prices depending on indication, 
combination therapy or patient response (Roche, 2015). 
Among the study countries, price revisions are carried out both periodically 
and in an ad hoc manner (Table 4.3). Regular revisions may concern individual 
pharmaceuticals, which are reviewed after a certain period following marketing 
authorization (for example, Greece and Ireland), groups of medicines (for 
example, Belgium, Germany and Ireland) or the full range of reimbursed 
medicines (for example, Portugal). They can be linked to the term of validity 
of agreements between payers and manufacturers (for example, France, Ireland, 
Italy) or to planned revisions of reimbursement decisions (for example, Finland, 
the Netherlands, Poland). Denmark employs price revisions as a means to 
stimulate competition in the context of price regulation: manufacturers have 
to submit their prices every two weeks; reimbursement prices are set based on 
the most inexpensive option. Ad hoc revisions are product-specific and can be 
triggered by manufacturers (for example, when requesting a price increase) or 
by competent authorities (for example, when a new medicine with the same 
active substance enters the market). 
Pharmaceuticals are frequently taxed with lower VAT rates compared to 
other goods or services (see Table 4.4). Among compared countries, standard 
VAT rates apply to pharmaceuticals only in Denmark and Germany (25% 
and 19%, respectively). France taxes reimbursed medicines with 2.1% and 
non-reimbursed medicines with 10%. In Sweden and the United Kingdom 
prescription-only medicines are VAT-free, while over-the-counter (OTC) 
medicines are taxed at standard rates. In Ireland, this differentiation is made 
between oral and non-oral medicines. In the remaining countries, reduced VAT 
rates range between 4% (Spain) and 10% (Austria, Finland, Italy). 
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Table 4.3
Timeframe and mode of price revisions, 2016
Country Price revision
Timeframe Mode
Austria Two additional evaluations at six-month 
intervals, if reference prices were available in 
fewer than 12 EU Member States at the time of 
the initial evaluation; ad hoc revisions 
Product specific
Belgium Periodically and ad hoc Reimbursement groups or single medicines 
upon requested price increase
Denmark Manufacturers report prices every two weeks; reimbursement price is based on cheapest option
Finland Ad hoc, periodically along with reimbursement 
decision
For individual medicines, due to requested price 
increase, patent expiration or market entry of 
therapeutic alternative
France Ad hoc (if new evidence available), periodically 
depending on the duration of agreements 
Product specific
Germany Periodically for maximum reimbursement 
amount (“Festbeträge”); reimbursement 
amounts after contract expiration
Per group (“Festbeträge”)  
Per active substance (following FJC resolution)
Greece Biannual revision within four years of market 
entry 
Full spectrum (periodic revisions)
Ireland Annually for reference groups, expiry of pricing 
and supply agreements for off-patent medicines
Per group, product specific
Italy Ad hoc and periodically depending on specific 
agreements
Per group (ad hoc), product specific
Netherlands Ad hoc, periodically along with reimbursement 
decision
Product specific; full spectrum (periodic 
revisions)
Poland Ad hoc, periodically in tiered intervals (every 
two-two-three-five years)
Product specific
Portugal Annual, ad hoc in specific cases Full spectrum
Spain Periodically (two years) and ad hoc Product specific, parallel revision
Sweden Ad hoc Product specific
United Kingdom Ad hoc (manufacturers can modify prices 
within the context of the PPRS)
Individual medicines, due to requested price 
increase or new evidence 
Source: Authors’ compilation.
Some countries modified their pricing stipulations in response to the 
economic crisis. Within this study’s sample, Belgium, Ireland and Portugal 
undertook changes in their ERP system. Greece introduced internal reference 
pricing and lower pharmaceutical VAT rates. 
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Table 4.4
General and pharmaceutical VAT rates, 2016
Country Standard VAT rate (%) VAT rates for pharmaceutical products (%)
Austria 20 10
Belgium 21 6
Denmark 25 25
Finland 24 10
France 20 2.1 for reimbursed medicines  
10 for non-reimbursed medicines
Germany 19 19
Greece 24 6
Ireland 23 0 for oral medicines  
23 for non-oral medicines
Italy 22 10
Netherlands 21 6
Poland 23 8
Portugal 23 6
Spain 21 4
Sweden 25 0 for prescription-only medicines 
25 for OTC medicines
UK – England 
20
0 for prescription-only medicines  
20 for OTC medicines
UK – Scotland
Source: Authors’ compilation, based on European Commission, 2016.

5. Reim
bursem
ent
5. Reimbursement
As illustrated in Chapter 3, post-marketing evaluation mechanisms aiming to inform reimbursement decisions on (new) pharmaceuticals in the statutory health system are closely linked to pricing. Decision-
making in the post-marketing stage can vary substantially with system structure, 
regarding process, and guiding criteria as well as institutions and stakeholders 
involved. However, some common characteristics can be discerned among the 
countries compared in this study: in principle, scientific evidence on the (added) 
value of a new medicine is assessed; conclusions are appraised in the decision-
making context and recommendations on reimbursement are formulated before 
a final decision is made3 (see Table 5.1). 
Specific committees responsible for formulating these recommendations 
have been established in all studied countries. These are separate from the 
working groups which carry out the scientific evidence assessment even if 
both are part of the same institution/authority. These institutions/authorities 
are sometimes also responsible for the final political decision on (non-)
reimbursement (for example, Denmark, Finland, Spain, Sweden), and/or even 
marketing authorization (for example, Denmark, Italy). In some cases, final 
decisions (for example, Belgium) or their implementation (for example, Sweden) 
can deviate from the recommendations of the reimbursement committee, 
usually as a result of societal or budgetary considerations. 
In Germany, reimbursement for newly authorized pharmaceuticals is 
considered as given once marketing authorization has been granted, unless 
these are explicitly excluded by the Federal Joint Committee (G-BA, see 
below). The Institute for Quality and Efficiency in Health Care (IQWiG) is 
commissioned by the G-BA to perform the scientific evaluation of evidence 
submitted by manufacturers. Following consultations, the G-BA decides on 
a pharmaceutical’s added therapeutic benefit based on IQWiG’s conclusions. 
3. Greece is the only country in the sample without its own structured mechanism of evidence-based evaluation: new pharmaceuticals 
are reimbursed if they are covered in two-thirds of EU countries or at least 12 countries with a positive PME result. Results of 
Health Technology Assessment (HTAs) performed in other countries have been considered in this process since 2012 (Vandoros & 
Stargardt, 2013).
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The demonstrated added therapeutic benefit then serves as a basis for 
price negotiations between the Federal Association of Sickness Funds and 
manufacturers (see Chapter 4). While no two systems in the sample are 
identical, a similar organizational structure to Germany’s can be found in 
Ireland. The National Centre for Pharmacoeconomics carries out the scientific 
assessment of submitted evidence (similar to IQWiG); their conclusions 
inform the Corporate Pharmaceutical Unit of the Health Service Executive 
(HSE) towards formulating recommendations before the final decision is taken, 
also by the HSE. An important difference is that in Ireland reimbursement 
eligibility is determined under consideration of a price submitted in advance 
by manufacturers and based on ERP (see also Chapters 3 and 4). Furthermore, 
while the HSE is a governmental institution, decisions on reimbursement in 
Germany are the responsibility of the joint self-government of actors in health 
care (represented by the G-BA).
Criteria guiding recommendations on reimbursement, as well as final 
decision-making, vary among countries in this study. However, therapeutic 
benefit is consistently taken into account. Economic considerations are also being 
increasingly examined in several cases. When economic evaluations are used, 
differences among countries may concern the chosen perspective (for example, 
payer, societal) as well as the exact method of analysis. Cost-effectiveness or 
cost-utility analyses are most frequently applied (see also Paris & Belloni, 2013). 
Stakeholder involvement also differs considerably, both in terms of process 
and parties involved. For example, in Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden 
official statements can be submitted during the evaluation process; in Belgium 
only applying manufacturers are involved.
In the majority of countries, reimbursement decision-making processes in 
the outpatient sector culminate in a positive list: pharmaceuticals are reimbursed 
once they are included on the list. In contrast, pharmaceuticals in Germany, 
Spain and the United Kingdom are fundamentally covered, unless they are 
explicitly excluded from reimbursement (i.e. placed on a “negative list”). Some 
countries employ both a positive and a negative list (for example, Greece, Italy). 
Negative lists should be used with caution if the intention is cost-containment, 
as excluded medicines may have costlier alternatives on the market (Carone, 
Schwierz & Xavier, 2012). Different positive lists can sometimes be used to 
operationalize reimbursement restrictions: for example, Denmark and Finland 
apply additional, disease-specific lists, while in Austria an ex-ante or ex-post 
control by the sickness fund is required for medicines in the so-called “yellow 
box” (separate list, see Annex II). 
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Reimbursement restrictions are possible in all studied countries but they 
vary in their exact rationale and configuration; for example, they can be applied 
according to patient or prescriber group or be product-specific. In the majority 
of countries, reimbursement restrictions based on indication are possible; 
Germany is an exception to this rule, as reimbursement eligibility encompasses 
all of a pharmaceutical’s authorized indications, including those for which no 
added benefit was demonstrated during evaluation. In Sweden, reimbursement 
is also product-specific: pharmaceuticals are basically reimbursed for the full 
indication spectrum or not at all; however, further restrictions are possible in 
exceptional cases, for example when patient benefit or cost-effectiveness ratios 
vary by subgroup. In such cases, it can be stipulated that a pharmaceutical can 
only be prescribed at the expense of the publicly financed (statutory) health 
system as a second-line therapy; this is the case for Crestor, which is only 
covered if treatment with generic Simvastatin has failed (TLV, 2007). Similarly, 
the Netherlands removed benzodiazepines for anxiety disorders from the 
positive list, unless preceding treatment with antidepressants was unsuccessful 
(Kroneman & de Jong, 2015); this led to a moderate decrease in benzodiazepine 
use in general practice (Hoebert et al., 2012). Nevertheless, such restrictions 
are rare in both countries.
Reimbursement restrictions are overall employed with varying frequencies 
among countries. An analysis of reimbursement decisions in England, Scotland 
and Sweden showed that restrictive reimbursement conditions are considerably 
more rare in Sweden (Nicod & Kanavos, 2012; see Fig. 5.1). According to 
expert opinion, roughly one in five reimbursement decisions in France included 
some form of restriction; these are far less common in Ireland and Spain. In 
Poland, restrictions are common practice, particularly for high-cost medicines 
in the inpatient sector, while in Belgium they are used relatively frequently for 
complex therapies.
Reimbursement decisions (especially positive lists) are regularly revised and 
updated in the majority of included countries (see Table 5.1), most commonly 
using a three-to-five year window. Ad hoc revisions are additionally carried 
out as a result of indication changes or extensions, availability of new evidence 
or market entry (and subsequent evaluation) of a therapeutic alternative. Such 
revisions can be triggered by competent authorities (for example, Belgium, 
Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, United Kingdom) or by 
manufacturers (for example, Austria, the Netherlands). In Italy, reimbursement 
contracts agreed between manufacturers and AIFA have a predetermined 
period of validity (usually two years); they are automatically renewed unless 
the manufacturer submits additional evidence for new negotiations sufficiently 
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in advance of contract expiration (minimum six months). Regular revisions 
are considered instrumental to the cost-containment function of positive lists 
(Carone, Schwierz & Xavier, 2012).  
Fig. 5.1
Reimbursement decisions in England, Scotland and Sweden, 2007–2009 (shares of 
full, restricted and no reimbursement in %)
Source: Authors’ compilation based on Nicod & Kanavos, 2012.
Many countries in the sample use additional arrangements to enable (broader) 
access to high-cost medicines for which uncertainty regarding effectiveness, 
cost-effectiveness or budget impact is high at the time of marketing authorization 
(Ferrario & Kanavos, 2013; 2015). These so-called managed entry agreements 
(MEAs) are negotiated between payers and manufacturers. They can be focused 
primarily on the financial component (for example, price-volume agreements) 
or be outcome-oriented. In the latter case, one can distinguish between schemes 
that aim to a) optimize utilization (for example, patient access schemes) or b) 
generate new evidence to overcome uncertainty (for example, coverage with 
evidence development4). Table 5.2 shows an overview of related practices in 
compared countries. The highest number of MEAs was identified in Italy. A 
maximum price is set for each pharmaceutical and can vary downwards by 
MEA. This can be linked to a predefined sales volume being surpassed (type 
“financial component”; cf. “volume-dependent price” in Fig. 4.2) or patients not 
responding to the medicine as expected (type “optimization of use”). MEAs 
19.1
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0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
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List List with restrictions Do not list
4. For a slightly different typology of MEAs see Ferrario & Kanavos, 2015.
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are also widespread in Spain, to the point where the actual role of the central 
evaluation and decision-making process is contested. In both Italy and Spain, 
regional authorities and autonomous communities respectively are responsible 
for the implementation of pharmaceutical care, including the implementation 
of MEAs. Mainly due to the confidential nature of MEAs, evidence on their 
overall impact is limited (Pani et al., 2016). 
Table 5.2
Managed Entry Agreements in studied countries, 2016
Country Financial arrangement 
(e.g. price-volume 
agreement)
Financial arrangement 
linked to optimizing 
utilization
Primarily evidence 
generation
Austria 
Belgium    
Denmark    
Finland None
France   
Germany    
Greece None, in discussion
Ireland   
Italy    
Netherlands   
Poland    
Portugal   
Spain    
Sweden   
UK – England   
UK – Scotland    
Source: Authors’ compilation, in part based on data from Ferrario & Kanavos, 2013; 2015.
In many countries, centralized decision-making processes apply only to 
the outpatient sector (see country profiles in Annex II), as hospitals are usually 
allowed to have their own positive lists. However, the delineation between 
inpatient and outpatient setting does not always remain clean-cut. For example, 
the Netherlands restricted dispensation of certain medicines to hospital 
pharmacies even for outpatients; these medicines are then financed through 
the hospital budget. This is currently the case for oral oncology drugs, TNF 
inhibitors and growth hormones. The goal of this regulation was to mitigate 
access inequalities caused by disputes between insurers and actors in the 
distribution chain. However, it introduces a new barrier, as patients can only 
pick up their medicines from the hospital; to address this, delivery at home 
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is possible in some cases. In Italy, hospital pharmacies are entitled to a 50% 
discount on the nominal price of medicines. To further contain costs and enable 
closer monitoring, hospital pharmacies became legally authorized to dispense 
certain pharmaceuticals to outpatients as well. Manufacturers in Sweden have 
often chosen to submit an application to TLV for the centralized decision-
making process, even for products which would in all likelihood never be used 
in the outpatient setting. A positive evaluation outcome has then functioned 
as a “seal of approval” and thus leverage in negotiations with hospitals. A new 
model was introduced in 2015 whereby TLV assists the New Therapies group 
of the county councils’ central organization (SALAR) with health economic 
evaluations based on voluntarily submitted manufacturer dossiers. The New 
Therapies group can then negotiate a price and/or risk-sharing agreement 
with the manufacturer and subsequently give a recommendation to the county 
councils. In the case of a negotiated agreement, the recommendation is to 
purchase the drug according to its provisions. Contractual arrangements 
with the manufacturers can be made by individual county councils only. This 
novel three-part negotiation between county councils, manufacturers and 
TLV is expected to serve as a model for the future development of pricing and 
reimbursement in Sweden.
Evidence-based decision-making processes were stepped up in several 
countries as a response to the economic crisis: Denmark established a new 
agency on priority-setting; Spain strengthened its HTA network; and France 
and Germany revised their evaluation criteria.
6. Patient cost-sharing
6. Patient cost-sharing
As a rule, costs for reimbursed medicines in the statutory health system are not exclusively covered through public financing: patients often need to carry some of the burden and pay part of the costs out-of-pocket 
(see also Chapter 2.1, page 8). Patient cost-sharing can function as a measure 
of both quality assurance and cost-containment but is not without risks. While 
it may facilitate the efficient utilization of health services, it can also introduce 
barriers to care for population groups with lower income.
Cost-sharing usually applies for pharmaceuticals prescribed in outpatient 
care. Belgium presents an interesting exception to this rule: copayments are 
also due for pharmaceuticals dispensed to inpatients, albeit at a different rate 
(mostly on a lump sum basis). A similar measure was established in Spain in 
the context of the economic crisis, but the Autonomous Communities never 
actually enforced these inpatient copayments and ongoing political discussion 
may lead to their official abolishment. In contrast, Sweden and Germany levy 
copayments on hospitalization days; while pharmaceuticals may be included, 
they are not calculated separately. 
Cost-sharing most commonly takes the form of a percentage share of the 
retail price of a medicine (see Table 6.1). The height of this share can vary by 
condition (for example, chronic diseases), income or employment status, or age. 
In France, cost-sharing levels are determined based on demonstrated benefit. 
Other countries determine the price share to be carried by the statutory health 
system as part of the reimbursement decision for each medicine (for example, 
Finland, Poland, Portugal). In the Finnish system a pharmaceutical can be 
covered up to 40%, 65% or 100% depending on the reimbursement group it is 
classified in. In the first two cases, 60% and 35% respectively have to be paid by 
patients out-of-pocket. In Denmark and Sweden, cost-sharing height depends 
on the patient’s total out-of-pocket costs per year: the higher these are, the lower 
subsequent cost-sharing rates become. In Ireland and Italy, copayments are 
fixed amounts that can vary with condition and income and are set at national 
and regional level, respectively. In Germany, cost-sharing amounts to 10% 
Health systems in transition  Pharmaceutical regulation in 15 European countries50
of retail price but has both a minimum (€5) and a maximum (€10) cap.5 In 
the Netherlands, pharmaceutical cost-sharing falls under the deductible rule: 
patients have to carry the first €375 of health care costs themselves before 
health insurance kicks in. Here too, insurers may decide to waive cost-sharing 
for certain medicines following agreement with manufacturers within the 
so-called “preferred medicines scheme” (see Chapter 7). In other countries, 
such as Austria and England, patients have to pay a fixed fee per prescription, 
prescribed medicine or package. Among the countries in this study, only 
Scotland completely forgoes pharmaceutical cost-sharing.
As a rule, patients are expected to carry the full costs for over-the-counter 
medicines. In countries using internal reference pricing (see Chapters 4 and 8), 
patients must also cover the price difference between reference benchmark and 
dispensed medicine, if they opt for a more expensive option, on top of other 
cost-sharing elements.
In almost all countries in this study there are specific provisions to protect 
patients from excessive out-of-pocket expenditure for pharmaceuticals. In 
addition to lower cost-sharing rates applicable to specific population groups, 
such as pensioners, many countries define maximum caps (for example, per 
patient and per year). Beyond this threshold value, patients are either eligible 
for lower cost-sharing or fully exempt. Additional insurance options covering 
cost-sharing are also available in many countries. In some, such options are 
particularly widespread: in France and the Netherlands more than 90% of the 
population takes out related voluntary health insurance policies.
Patient cost-sharing was one of the cost-containment mechanisms most 
frequently modified as part of health systems’ response to the economic crisis. 
Pharmaceutical cost-sharing was both increased (for example, Finland, France, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain; Sweden modified its financial protection 
rules, see Thomson et al., 2014) and decreased (mainly Germany, which 
abolished copayments for drugs with prices at least 30% below the maximum 
reimbursement amount in 2006, and Scotland, which lowered copayments for 
drugs in 2008 and 2010, and abolished them in 2011). 
5. Pharmaceuticals in the internal reference pricing system with a price at least 30% lower than the maximum reimbursement amount 
are free of cost-sharing. In the context of individual discount agreements, sickness funds may decide to waive cost-sharing 
specifically for the medicines in question.
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7. Targeted measures of cost 
containment
As illustrated in previous chapters, all countries employ a range of both supply- and demand-side measures aiming to control pharmaceutical costs in the statutory health system. Due to differences in the exact 
implementation of specific regulations (even when they are applied across 
countries), the final retail price of a pharmaceutical consists of varying 
shares reverting to different actors in the distribution chain (manufacturers, 
wholesalers, pharmacists) and the state (through taxes and rebates). According 
to EFPIA data on 23 European countries for 2013, on average 66.1% of the 
retail price of medicines went to manufacturers, 4.9% to wholesalers, 19.2% to 
pharmacists and 9.8% to the state (EFPIA, 2015). 
In the following sections, relevant measures will be examined per targeted 
stakeholder group. Patient participation as a demand-side measure is explored 
separately in Chapter 6.
7.1 Industry
In addition to negotiations taking place as part of the overall pricing process 
in some countries (see Chapter 4), there is a range of measures pertaining to 
manufacturers and aiming to contain costs in the statutory health system (see 
Table 7.1).
Discounts and rebates to public payers are among the most commonly 
applied measures of price control targeting manufacturers and have been 
assuming an increasing role in many countries over the last few years (Bouvy 
& Vogler, 2013). While discounts are agreed price reductions for specific 
payers which apply before the product is purchased, rebates are returned to 
the payer after the transaction has been completed. Discounts and rebates can 
be applied universally (legally imposed and pertaining to all manufacturers 
and payers in the system) or be negotiated between individual payers and 
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manufacturers. In the inpatient sector, prices are usually agreed on between 
hospital and manufacturer anyway; thus, discounts and rebates have long found 
application in this setting. For example, 95% of prices for inpatient medicines in 
Austria lie between 30 and 35% below those in the retail market. For patented 
pharmaceuticals outside the internal reference pricing system (“Festbeträge”) 
in Germany, manufacturers are obliged to return to the sickness funds a share 
of 7% of the price (net of VAT) of pharmaceuticals dispensed at the funds’ 
expense. For off-patent medicines, this share goes up to 16% unless they are 
priced at least 30% below the applicable maximum reimbursement amount. 
Legally imposed (universal) discounts and rebates have been used by several 
countries in this study (for example, Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal, 
Spain – see Vogler et al., 2012).
Table 7.1
Cost-containment measures targeting manufacturers, 2016
Country Public tendering Discounts/Rebates to 
public payers
Price freezes
Austria Inpatient sector (partially) Yes No
Belgium Inpatient sector Yes Yes
Denmark Inpatient sector Inpatient sector Yes
Finland Inpatient sector Inpatient sector Yes
France Inpatient sector Yes Yes
Germany Outpatient sector Yes Yes
Greece Inpatient sector Yes Yes
Ireland Inpatient sector Yes Yes
Italy Inpatient sector (regional) Yes Yes
Netherlands Outpatient sector Yes No
Poland Inpatient sector Inpatient sector No
Portugal Inpatient sector Inpatient sector Yes
Spain Mainly inpatient sector 
(regional)
Yes Yes
Sweden Inpatient sector Inpatient sector No
UK – England Inpatient sector Yes Yes
UK – Scotland Inpatient sector Yes Yes
Source: Authors’ compilation.
German sickness funds can also negotiate individual discount contracts 
with manufacturers. Individual agreements between payers and manufacturers 
are almost exclusively confidential in all countries and their characteristics, 
including extent and value, are therefore challenging to describe. This lack of 
transparency can distort pharmaceutical prices in the mid-term, as negotiated 
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price reductions are not reflected in price referencing strategies (see also Chapter 
4). Individual contracts are most commonly used to stimulate competition in 
the generics market. A survey of 25 European countries showed that such 
contracts were a common occurrence (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, 
Italy and Portugal in this sample, as well as six other EU countries) and reached 
reductions of up to 50% of the list price, compared to between 3% and 32.5% 
for legally imposed discounts and rebates (Vogler et al., 2012). Rebates linked 
to sales volumes of pharmaceutical companies identified in the same study 
spanned 1–8% of sales volume. In France, such rebates amounted to €546 
million in 2013 and €711 million in 2014 (CEPS, 2015).
Public tendering is also widely used as a way to drive down pharmaceutical 
prices. As a rule, submitted prices are the main element inf luencing the 
outcome of the tendering process, although IMS reports that additional value 
considerations have begun to gain importance (IMS, 2015). Traditionally, 
tendering has been employed in the inpatient sector (for example in Denmark, 
where it is centralized across the country, see AMGROS, 2016), but its 
application for outpatient drugs has been increasing in recent years. For example, 
Spain uses public tendering in the outpatient sector for specific pharmaceuticals 
only, such as antiretrovirals. In Italy, public tendering has often been used to 
obtain further discounts by means of public procurement based on therapeutic 
equivalency (different pharmaceuticals for the same target). The Netherlands 
introduced the so-called “preferred medicines” principle, whereby payers use 
public tendering to choose specific products from each active substance group, 
which are then considered favoured for a limited period of time; they are the 
only ones reimbursed within a given indication for this period. This approach 
was deemed so successful in controlling prices that other related measures, such 
as price freezes, were abandoned.
However, price freezes are used in many countries in the study sample 
(excluding Austria, Poland and Sweden). In such cases, pharmaceutical prices 
cannot be raised for a predetermined period of time, or payers are entitled 
to manufacturer rebates compensating for potential price increases since the 
beginning of the moratorium period. 
Price reductions were widely used in response to the economic crisis (for 
example, Belgium, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain). 
In 2014 Sweden introduced a 15-year rule, whereby obligatory price reductions 
(7.5%) are imposed on pharmaceuticals with a market presence of over 15 years. 
A similar measure is also in place in Belgium. Following market entry of the 
high-cost medicines against Hepatitis C, France introduced a disease-specific 
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cap: the annual budget for Hepatitis C treatments is determined by Parliament. 
In the same context, the Swedish county councils entered risk-sharing 
agreements with manufacturers (see also Chapter 5) and received substantial 
financial support from the central government.6
7.2 Pharmacists and Wholesalers
Multiple distribution channels are in place in all comparator countries, but 
the number and density of pharmacists and wholesalers vary substantially 
(Kanavos, Schurer & Vogler, 2011). Pharmaceutical distribution is considered 
a very dynamic landscape characterized by several changes in recent years. The 
mark-ups and other remuneration elements for both wholesalers and pharmacists 
are regulated in detail in the majority of investigated countries. They differ in 
both size and mode of calculation (see Table 7.2). Wholesaler margins in Europe 
reportedly range between ca. 2% and 8% of the retail price of pharmaceuticals, 
while average pharmacist margins are less transparent and can, in isolated 
cases, reach up to 50% of the wholesale price (Kanavos & Wouters, 2014). 
The majority of compared countries applies regressive pharmacy margins to 
disincentivize dispensing expensive products. Combinations of percentual and 
fixed components are also common. In the inpatient sector, distribution margins 
may not apply at all as hospitals often use tendering processes or negotiate 
directly with manufacturers.
In many countries in the study sample, rebates or clawback schemes apply 
to wholesalers and/or pharmacists. For example, German pharmacists have to 
return €1.77 per dispensed prescription-only medicine to the sickness funds 
(down from €2.05 before 2013). For over-the-counter (OTC) drugs a 5% rebate 
was set, levied on retail price. In 2012 these pharmacy rebates amounted to €1.2 
billion, or around 4% of SHI pharmaceutical expenditure (Busse & Blümel, 
2014). Germany also introduced a temporary wholesaler rebate (0.85% of 
manufacturer price) in 2011.
Encouraging the use of parallel imports can also contribute to cost 
containment in countries where pharmaceutical prices are comparatively high. 
Parallel imports are made possible by the free movement of goods within the EU 
internal market. As such, a parallel imported medicinal product can be defined 
as “a product bought by a third company independent of the original marketing 
authorisation holder or manufacturer in another Member State of the EU or 
EEA and imported into [the reference country] to be marketed there in parallel 
6. For an in-depth look at strategies regarding high-cost, highly innovative medicines, see WHO, 2015.
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to the product marketed by the original pharmaceutical company. In economic 
terms, parallel import of pharmaceuticals is a consequence of the differing 
price levels for pharmaceuticals within the EU or EEA” (BfArM, 2016). Parallel 
trade is widespread in the European pharmaceutical market: the European 
Commission estimated its turnover at €3.5–5 million in 2009, corresponding 
to 2–3% of the market. Some countries have introduced measures to promote 
parallel imports. Such measures can include obliging pharmacists to inform 
patients about the availability of related products or to stock a predetermined 
share of parallel imported products or providing financial incentives for parallel 
import dispensation (Kanavos, Gross & Taylor, 2005). Differences in the 
implementation of such measures led to varying market penetrations of parallel 
imports in studied countries (see Fig. 7.1). In Germany, pharmacists are obliged 
to dispense parallel imported products if their price is 15% (or at least €15) 
lower than that of the reference product, net of legally imposed rebates (“aut 
idem” provision, see also Chapter 8). On the reverse side of this mechanism, the 
price differential within the internal market can lead to considerable parallel 
exports in countries such as Greece and Portugal, contributing to medicines 
shortages (see also Vogler et al., 2015).
Fig. 7.1
Share of parallel imports in pharmacy market sales, 2013
Source: EFPIA, 2015.
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Wholesalers and pharmacists were less frequently targeted in the context of 
efficiency measures following the economic crisis. Mainly profit margins were 
modified in some countries (for example, France, Poland, Portugal).
7.3 Physicians/Prescribers
On the demand side of the pharmaceutical market, physicians and other 
professions who are entitled to prescribe medicines are also targets for measures 
aiming at cost containment or efficiency gains through quality assurance 
(see Table 7.3). Such measures need to balance the scientific independence 
and professional expertise of prescribers with the overall optimization of 
pharmaceutical care. In most European countries, physicians have exclusivity in 
their right to prescribe medicines and thus play a crucial role in their rational use. 
Prescribing or pharmaceutical budgets are instruments used to control the 
pharmaceutical expenditure of individual prescribers or prescriber groups. 
Within a given timeframe, professionals can prescribe medicines up to a 
specified expenditure limit. Furthermore, staying within budget limits can 
be linked to financial incentives. Among comparator countries, prescribing 
budgets are not frequently employed. In England, they are in place for general 
practitioners and are determined per administrative unit (clinical commissioning 
group, CCG) and practice and revised on an annual basis. In contrast, Scottish 
GPs can prescribe freely. In Germany, regional pharmaceutical budgets were 
replaced by practice-specific target volumes in 2001. Since then, associations of 
sickness funds and social health insurance physicians at state level are mandated 
to determine an annual expenditure volume and derive target volumes for 
individual practices. Despite the fact that these target volumes are not strictly 
comparable to budgets, as they lack hard limits beyond which prescribing is 
no longer possible, exceeding predefined benchmarks can lead to retrospective 
requests for justification and potential paybacks to sickness funds. In Italy, 
prescription targets are set by regional governments and local health authorities.
Another strategy towards rational pharmacotherapy and increased efficiency 
are prescribing guidelines. These are formulated by payers, national health 
authorities or professional associations and are more or less binding in their 
enforcement. In most countries, they are understood as guiding principles for 
high-quality, efficient care, which do not overrule the professional judgement 
of prescribers. The same is true for monitoring of prescribing behaviours 
and volumes. Monitoring systems are in place in the majority of compared 
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Table 7.3
Measures for improved quality and efficiency targeting prescribers, 2016
Country Pharmaceutical 
budgets
Prescribing 
guidelines
Incentives/
Sanctions
Electronic 
prescribing
Prescription 
monitoring
Austria No Binding Incentives at 
regional level 
Sanctions rare 
(e.g. termination 
of contract)
Piloted (opt-out 
possible)
Yes (at regional 
level)
Belgium Quotas Not binding Incentives, 
sanctions (rare)
Mandatory in 
hospitals, piloted 
in outpatient 
sector
Yes
Denmark No Not binding No (consultation) Yes Yes
Finland No Not binding No Yes (mandatory 
as of 2017)
Yes
France No Not binding As part of pay for 
performance 
(“Rémunération 
sur Objectifs de 
Santé Publique”)
Yes (opt-in 
possible)
Yes
Germany No Binding Exceeding target 
volumes may 
necessitate 
paybacks
Yes Yes
Greece Yes Binding Sanctions 
theoretically 
possible, rarely 
implemented
Yes Yes
Ireland No Not binding No No (planned) Yes
Italy Yes (for GPs, 
regional and 
local health 
authorities)
Not binding Incentives 
(regional); 
Sanctions 
theoretically 
possible, not 
implemented
Yes (partially 
introduced)
Yes (regional and 
local health 
authorities)
Netherlands No Not binding No Yes Yes
Poland No Not binding Sanctions for 
wrong 
prescriptions
Planned Yes
Portugal No Not binding Incentives (for 
specific 
physician 
groups)
Yes Yes
Spain No Not binding Incentives Yes No
Sweden Yes (on province 
and practice 
basis)
Not binding Varies by 
province
Yes (~98%) Yes
UK – England Yes (NHS –> 
CCGs –> GPs)
Not binding Incentives Yes Yes
UK – Scotland No Not binding No Yes Yes 
Source: Authors’ compilation.
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countries, but are organized differently depending on system structure (for 
example, regionally, per payer, etc.). As a rule, their main purpose consists 
of benchmarking the prescribing behaviour of individual doctors to that of 
their peers and facilitating its optimization based on recognizable prescription 
patterns. Examples of such systems are the “Business Intelligence in 
Healthcare” platform in Austria, the Ordiprax system in Denmark and the 
GAmSI system in Germany. Monitoring systems can be linked to incentives or 
specific agreements (such as the prescription of a predefined quota in low-cost 
medicines). In France and Sweden, monitoring is linked to pay-for-performance 
remuneration schemes. In Sweden, the implementation of these strategies varies 
by county council.
While there is no comprehensive, evidence-based evaluation of the 
success of the aforementioned measures (Carone, Schwierz & Xavier, 2012), 
a combination of different strategies is considered to be the most reasonable 
approach (Vogler, Zimmermann & Habimana, 2013). This reflects the reality 
in all countries in this study. 
In the context of the economic crisis, some countries (for example, Denmark, 
Greece, Portugal) introduced or expanded prescribing guidelines to curb 
the inefficient use of pharmaceuticals. Portugal also implemented a new 
prescription monitoring system. 
8. Generics
8. Generics
Generics are usually less costly than their originator products, owing to much lower research and development costs for manufacturers, who profit from patent expirations of already established pharmaceuticals. 
The use of generics is endorsed in all studied countries as a cost-containment 
mechanism, with varying intensity. Generic substitution is possible in almost 
all countries in the sample (with the exception of Austria), while some even 
make it mandatory (for example, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Sweden). 
In France, generic substitution is incentivized both through the pay-for-
performance remuneration scheme for doctors and through higher profit 
margins or add-on payments for pharmacists. As a rule, patients can refuse 
substitution but are then expected to pay the difference in price out-of-pocket 
(see also Chapter 4). In France, patients refusing substitution have to pay the 
full amount of the dispensed medicine out-of-pocket and file for subsequent 
reimbursement in full.
To enable and support generic substitution, prescription of active substance 
(international nonproprietary name, INN) rather than trade name has been 
institutionalized in many countries. While this approach is employed in the 
majority of countries in the study sample, it is variably regulated (see Table 8.1).
In Germany, the so-called “aut idem” provision is used as an indirect 
measure of price regulation: pharmacists are obliged to dispense a product 
cheaper than the originator as long as this has not been ruled out by the 
prescribing physician.7 For each active substance, products with a negotiated 
discount contract between the patient’s sickness fund and the manufacturer 
have priority; should such products not be available, cheaper options need to 
be considered, including parallel imports with a price at least 15% lower than 
the originator (net of the legally imposed general rebate). A similar regulation 
was introduced in Belgium in 2012: pharmacists are obliged to dispense a more 
affordable product but have the choice between the three least expensive options 
in each equivalence group (they are obliged to dispense the cheapest option for 
7. Authorized indication, package size and dose strength need to be identical and the form of administration identical or interchangeable.
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INN prescriptions). Further measures to support the use of generics include 
incentivization within pay-for-performance schemes (for example, France, see 
above) or defined low-cost quotes for doctors (for example, Belgium). 
Table 8.1
Generic policies, 2016
Country Generic substitution INN prescribing Professionals 
entitled to 
prescription/
substitution
Share of generics 
(latest available 
data) 
Austria No No Doctor Volume: 52.1%  
Value: 46.9%  
(Reimbursed 
pharmaceutical 
market 2014, see 
footnote 8; Source: 
OECD, 2016a)
Belgium Mandatory No Doctor/Pharmacist  
(only for antibiotics 
and anti-
inflammatory 
medicines)
Volume: 32.7%  
Value: 14.0%  
(Reimbursed 
pharmaceutical 
market 2014; Source: 
OECD, 2016a)
Denmark Yes Not mandatory Doctor/Pharmacist Volume: 56.6%  
Value: 14.9%  
(Reimbursed 
pharmaceutical 
market 2014; Source: 
OECD, 2016a)
Finland Mandatory Not mandatory Pharmacist  
(Doctor can prohibit 
substitution)
Volume: 40%  
Value: 17%  
(Total 
pharmaceutical 
market 2014; Source: 
OECD 2016a )
France Incentivized Mandatory Pharmacist  
(Doctor can prohibit 
substitution)
Volume: 31.6%  
Value: 18.2%  
(Reimbursed 
pharmaceutical 
market 2014; Source: 
CEPS 2015)
Germany Yes (see text) Not mandatory Doctor/Pharmacist Volume: 81.0%  
Value: 36.2%  
(Reimbursed 
pharmaceutical 
market 2014; Source: 
OECD, 2016a)
Greece Mandatory Mandatory Doctor/Pharmacist Volume: 20.1% 
Value: 19% 
(Reimbursed 
pharmaceutical 
market 2014; Source: 
OECD, 2016a)
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Country Generic substitution INN prescribing Professionals 
entitled to 
prescription/
substitution
Share of generics 
(latest available 
data) 
Ireland Yes Not mandatory Pharmacist Volume: 34.7% 
Value: 16.4% 
(Reimbursed 
pharmaceutical 
market 2014; Source: 
OECD, 2016a)
Italy Mandatory (if not 
ruled out by 
prescriber and 
accepted by patient)
Mandatory (brand 
name can be 
displayed 
additionally)
Doctor/Pharmacist Volume generics: 
21.0% Value 
generics: 12.0% 
(Reimbursed 
pharmaceutical 
market 2014; Source: 
OECD, 2016a)
Netherlands Mandatory Mandatory Doctor/Pharmacist Volume: 71.4% 
Value: 16.5% 
(Reimbursed 
pharmaceutical 
market 2014; Source: 
OECD, 2015d)
Poland Yes Not mandatory Doctor/Pharmacist Volume: 69%  
Value: 41%  
(2014; Source: 
Albrecht et al., 2015)
Portugal Mandatory Mandatory (brand 
name can be 
displayed 
additionally)
Pharmacist Volume: 40.8% 
Value: 24.1% 
(Reimbursed 
pharmaceutical 
market 2014; Source: 
OECD, 2016a)
Spain Mandatory Mandatory Doctor/Pharmacist Volume: 47.6%  
Value: 21.8%  
(Reimbursed 
pharmaceutical 
market 2014; Source: 
OECD, 2016a)
Sweden Mandatory Not mandatory Doctor/Pharmacist Volume: 55%  
Value: 13%  
(2014; Source: 
Albrecht et al., 2015)
United Kingdom Yes Yes Doctor/Pharmacist Volume: 84.3%  
Value: 34.9%  
(Reimbursed 
pharmaceutical 
market 2014; Source: 
OECD, 22016a)
Source: Authors’ compilation.
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Relevant regulation and its implementation also influence the market 
penetration of generic products. In terms of volume, the United Kingdom and 
Germany lead the sample with 83.4% and 79.5% respectively. At the other 
end of the spectrum are countries like Italy, Greece, Ireland and France, all 
with shares of 30% or lower (see Table 8.1). In terms of value, Poland (41%) 
and Germany (37%) take the top two spots in the sample,8 with a number of 
countries showing shares of around 15% at the other end of the spectrum. 
Several countries took steps to tighten their generics policies in response 
to the economic crisis. For example, Belgium and Spain encouraged the 
cost-efficient use of medicines (and thus generics) and generic substitution, 
respectively. Greece and Portugal introduced INN prescribing. According to 
the OECD, such policies have in all likelihood facilitated the increasing market 
share of generics in many countries over the past ten years (OECD, 2015). 
However, most European countries could still enhance their endorsement of 
generics, for example, by accelerating market access for generics, promoting 
their use and lowering their prices (Bouvy & Vogler, 2013; Kanavos 2014). 
8. While the value share of generics in Austria appears even higher in OECD figures, IMS data place the actual figure much lower, at 
19% (value) and 35% (volume) in 2014. This is in all likelihood due to the fact that Austria data reported to the OECD concern the 
potentially reimbursable market compared to market shares in other countries.
9. International com
parisons 
 of pharm
aceutical prices
9. International comparisons of 
pharmaceutical prices
Undertaking international comparisons of pharmaceutical prices requires the consideration of a multitude of methodological issues and country-specific factors. Depending on the goal of each study 
both the general approach and the exact methodological configuration can 
vary substantially across important parameters. Thus, this chapter has two 
aims and is structured accordingly: first, to provide a brief introduction to 
methodological considerations for international price comparisons that are 
vital for understanding and interpreting results; then, in accompaniment to the 
detailed description of country-level mechanisms of pharmaceutical regulation 
provided in previous chapters, to give an overview of (resulting) price levels 
in studied countries.
9.1 Methodological elements in international 
comparisons of pharmaceutical prices 
There are two main types of cross-country comparison most commonly 
found in the international literature: 
a. comparisons of (multiple) individual products, usually with a view to 
benchmark prices (and potentially enable reference pricing) or explore 
potential price discriminations; and 
b. comparisons of product samples (or “baskets”) aiming to explore 
differences in average price levels and provide insight on the effectiveness 
of national regulatory instruments (Danzon & Kim, 1998; Wagner & 
McCarthy, 2004). 
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In this context, it is impossible to stipulate one methodological approach 
to fit all intentions; however, important dimensions that need to be handled 
carefully in the context of international comparisons of pharmaceutical prices 
have been identified (Andersson, 1993) and evaluated (Machado et al., 2011; 
Vogler & Martikainen, 2016). They are presented and briefly discussed below.
Choice of comparator countries
Andersson (1993) supports that all international price comparisons 
fundamentally assume that included countries are sufficiently comparable 
and/or that consumers in different countries have the same preferences in 
regard to pharmaceuticals. However, actual consumption patterns can vary 
considerably even among relatively homogeneous country samples (see 
also Chapter 2) and reflect, among others, demographic and epidemiologic 
characteristics, traditions in clinical management and issues of reimbursement 
and distribution, but also the country’s general economic power and willingness 
to pay. Identifying countries that are comparable across all these factors is 
usually difficult, if not impossible, to achieve. In some cases it can therefore 
be assumed that countries in geographical proximity or those with similar 
economic profiles also demonstrate comparable health parameters (Machado 
et al., 2011). However, this can be only partially applicable depending on 
the study’s objective and specific research questions (WHO, 2008). The 
consideration of economic factors itself can furthermore take different shapes: 
while some studies differentiate between high-income and low-income 
countries (Cameron et al., 2009; Danzon & Furukawa, 2008; Vogler, 2016), 
ability and willingness to pay can vary substantially within these groups. This 
component is particularly decisive for comparisons aiming to directly inform 
pricing or related regulation. In this context, several authors find that GDP 
per capita should be considered in the selection of comparator countries and/
or used to adjust included prices (Danzon & Furukawa, 2008; Machado et al., 
2011; Cassel & Ulrich, 2012; Mahlich et al., 2014), not least as an indicator of 
affordability in different countries. However, this is rarely the case in published 
comparative studies (Machado et al., 2011).
Selection of included pharmaceuticals
To be able to formulate representative conclusions about the average price level 
in different countries, comparative studies would ideally have to be based on 
randomly selected samples of pharmaceuticals. Varying availability of different 
drugs across countries renders this approach particularly challenging to 
implement in practice. Alternatively, Andersson and McMenamin recommend 
forming a relatively big basket with the top (100–200) pharmaceuticals in terms 
of sales or volume in each country, as these may to some extent also reflect 
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respective consumer preferences (Andersson, 1993). This approach has been 
applied by a number of published comparisons (Machado et al., 2011). However, 
even “best-seller”-samples will in all likelihood not be fully available in all 
countries in a study; in such cases, it is methodologically sounder to limit 
calculations to available medicines instead of imputing missing prices (Danzon 
& Kim, 1998). Furthermore, best-seller approaches bear the risk of mainly or 
solely including originator products (Wagner & McCarthy, 2004). This can 
substantially bias the validity of results regarding general average price levels, 
as generics account for a substantial share of prescriptions in many countries 
(see Chapter 8). Pharmaceuticals with multiple active substances pose an 
additional challenge, as the ratio between molecules may vary across countries. 
Finally, a priori excluding over-the-counter medicines can also introduce biases 
and/or further limit samples (Danzon & Kim, 1998). If the goal is to explore 
prices for a specific indication or even a specific product, smaller sample sizes 
are also found in the literature. 
Selection of appropriate prices
Depending on study objectives, manufacturer, wholesaler or retail prices 
can be used for cross-country comparisons and could lead to substantial 
differences in results. All three price types may be plagued by inconsistencies. 
Most comparative studies use manufacturer sale prices (Wagner & McCarthy, 
2004; Machado et al., 2011). Given the differences in distribution margins 
illustrated in Chapter 7, these build a reasonable, relatively uniform basis for 
comparison. However, publicly available list prices do not reflect discounts 
and rebates, which can have a substantial effect on actual prices and thus 
pharmaceutical expenditure (see also Chapters 4 and 7). Overall, the public 
availability of price information may vary: if different price types are available 
in comparator countries and used for one study, additional caution is required 
to ensure that truly comparable prices are considered. This concerns both 
subtracting distribution margins and accounting for varying VAT rates (see 
also Chapter 4). Additionally, when prices are not identical throughout the 
country (for example for the hospital sector, the OTC market and the private 
sector) and are thus not available in a single national price list, information 
will in all likelihood need to be collected from individual health care providers 
(Vogler & Martikainen, 2016).
Comparability of included products
Package size, dose strength, form of administration and dispensation modalities 
can also vary across countries and reflect both therapeutic traditions and 
regulatory differences. Many studies use a “typical” package in the reference 
country as their unit of comparison; this approach can substantially bias results 
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as the same package may be atypical (or not available) in comparator countries. 
On the other hand, limiting the comparison to identical packages only would 
severely restrict sample size. Different approaches have been used to enable 
aggregation across dose strengths, forms of administration and packages, and 
to determine one price per comparable entity. This can be a “standard unit” (for 
example, pill, capsule, injection vial, 5ml of liquid, etc.), a gram, or a defined 
daily dose (DDD; see Vogler & Martikainen, 2016 on the suitability of DDDs 
for international price comparisons). All three approaches lead to comparable 
results as they essentially constitute scaling of prices on the basis of the quantity 
of the active substance contained in a package. While this information is not 
always explicitly mentioned in pharmaceutical price comparisons, standard 
units and DDDs are often used to normalize prices (Danzon & Kim, 1998; 
Machado et al., 2011).
Calculating average prices
Comparative studies exploring average prices on the basis of a larger sample of 
products need to account for the fact that not all included pharmaceuticals will 
have the same impact on the general price level in a country. In this respect, 
consumption patterns and local epidemiological factors can render some 
medicines “more important” than others (WHO, 2008), a fact which would 
be ignored by simple arithmetic averaging. In such cases, it is appropriate to 
use weighted price indexes, for example on the basis of sales, market shares or 
prescription volumes. Depending on which country is to be used as a reference 
to create weights, different indexes can be constructed (for example, the 
Lespeyres index, the Paasche index or the Fischer index; see Danzon & Kim, 
1998; Danzon & Chao, 2000; Danzon & Furukawa, 2008). Price comparisons 
aiming to explore the effect of regulation on prices in a given country tend 
to use this country as a weighting reference (Wagner & McCarthy, 2004), 
potentially leading to a relative underestimation of its general price level (also 
known as the Gerschenkron effect, see Danzon & Kim, 1998).
Conversion of prices into one currency
A comparison of international prices is only possible if these are expressed 
in a common currency. For this purpose, official exchange rates are the most 
common choice (Andersson, 1993; Machado et al., 2011). Some authors 
expressly favour exchange rates in this context, as pharmaceuticals are 
internationally tradeable goods and exchange rates are used to determine 
manufacturers’ actual net revenues from foreign sales (Danzon & Kim, 1998). 
Nevertheless, exchange rates are volatile and strongly influenced by capital 
flows between countries as well as by currency speculations; they therefore 
usually depict additional elements beyond price differences (Burg, 2011). To 
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mitigate this problem, some studies use the average exchange rate over a time 
period instead of at a given date. Furthermore, conversions using exchange rates 
do not account for variability in purchasing power among countries with the 
same currency (for example, those in the Eurozone) stemming from differences 
in income and general price level. Purchasing power parities (PPPs) are an 
alternative to exchange rates and address the aforementioned issues: they offer 
a more representative reflection of actual price levels and are less unstable and 
susceptible to speculation. However, their mode of calculation and robustness 
are not uncontested (Andersson, 1993; Burg, 2011). 
Reviews of the methodological quality of international pharmaceutical price 
comparisons uniformly conclude that they all demonstrate methodological 
problems and/or are not adequately transparent about methodological decisions 
(Andersson, 1993; Wagner & McCarthy, 2004; Machado et al., 2011). Especially 
if price comparisons are to be used to guide political decisions, it is crucial that 
their underlying methodology is clearly described and comprehensible.
9.2 Comparison of price levels among studied 
countries 
Comparative studies found in international literature are written from varying 
perspectives and employ different methodologies (see above). The majority of 
these studies focuses on cross-country comparisons of prices for (a number of) 
individual products, often within one indication field (for example, oncologics), 
within a certain price spectrum (for example, high-priced medicines) or 
authorized/evaluated within a given timeframe (for example, pharmaceuticals 
entering the German market after 2011). To provide a concise and representative 
overview about the situation in studied countries, the following paragraphs focus 
on published studies comparing comprehensive baskets of pharmaceuticals. 
Table 9.1 summarizes the results of four different approaches using the 
best-seller principle described above: 
1. Two publications based on the 2005 Eurostat and OECD Purchasing 
Power Programme compared retail prices (including margins and taxes; 
compare Tables 4.4 and 7.2) at country level to the EU and OECD 
averages at the time (Konijn, 2007; OECD, 2008). Germany demonstrated 
the highest average prices at 28% and 27% above the EU and OECD 
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averages, respectively, followed relatively closely by Denmark, Ireland 
and Italy. Poland, Greece and Spain were at the other end of the spectrum 
with average prices at least 20% lower than the EU and OECD averages. 
2. Based on newer IMS data on retail prices net of VAT, the study by Brekke 
and Holmås (2012) compared average wholesale and retail prices in nine 
countries in reference to Sweden (eight countries in our sample and 
Norway). In the overall sample, the highest aggregated retail prices were 
found in Ireland and the lowest in the United Kingdom, when identical 
packs were considered; once prices were scaled by dose, Germany 
demonstrated the highest prices, while Ireland (now in second place) was 
much closer to Denmark than in the identical pack comparison. A similar 
pattern emerges for wholesale prices, with price differences to Sweden 
(the reference country) maintaining directionality and diminishing in size; 
the only exception here was Finland, which showed average retail prices 
about 10 percentage points higher than Sweden and wholesale prices 
about 10 percentage points lower. 
3. Annual calculations comparing manufacturer prices in the context of the 
Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme (see also Chapter 3) found that, 
for the period from 2005 to 2011 and among ten comparator countries, 
Germany had the highest average prices (excluding distribution margins 
and taxes) in reference to the United Kingdom. 
4. While all previous approaches used exchange rates to make prices in 
different currencies comparable, a newer study comparing prices in 
Germany to Austria, France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom 
compared price calculations based on exchange rates and PPPs as well 
as a further adjustment for GDP (see Section 9.1). Adjusting prices using 
PPPs increases the difference between the four comparator countries 
and Germany (i.e. average prices in all five are lower compared to the 
calculation using exchange rates); an additional adjustment for GDP 
leads to a decrease in average price difference to Germany for France 
and the United Kingdom compared to the calculation using PPPs only. 
France (lower GDP per capita but a higher PPP than Germany) is the 
only comparator for which a GDP adjustment brings average prices 
closer to their German counterparts compared to no adjustment. Other 
studies that compared the application of exchange rates and PPPs to 
adjust international prices also found that using PPPs depreciates prices 
in countries with higher income levels and appreciates them in countries 
with lower income levels (Danzon & Furukawa, 2008; Mahlich et al., 
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2014), indicating that pharmaceutical prices are in general higher or lower, 
respectively, than those for other goods in comparison to the reference 
country (see also Fig. 9.1).
Fig. 9.1
Effects of adjusting for PPP and/or GDP in international comparisons of 
pharmaceutical prices
Sources: Authors’ compilation, based on OECD, 2016d; European Central Bank, 2016; and Central Bank of Iceland, 2016 
(the average annual exchange rate in 2014 was used for calculations on the y-axis).
Taking Germany as a starting point and taking price components into 
account, these four studies reach consistent results despite their variable baskets: 
on average Germany had 10% higher manufacturer prices and 30% higher 
retail prices (incl. VAT) than the United Kingdom in 2005; this difference 
had surpassed 50% for both manufacturer and retail prices (net of VAT) by 
2010 and the amplitude seems to have decreased again by 2015. Ireland is 
another interesting example: manufacturer prices are shown to have increased 
substantially between 2005 and 2009, while the consideration of pharmacy and 
wholesaler margins raises prices even above Germany; manufacturer prices 
show a decreasing trend after 2009, in all likelihood as a result of the economic 
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crisis. The above observations also clearly highlight the importance of carefully 
reflecting on price type, sample size and composition as well as adjustment 
practices when evaluating the results of international comparisons.
An econometric analysis of IMS data on 39 innovative medicines in 13 
countries showed that a higher ability to pay (represented by GDP) led to 
higher prices and using external reference pricing led to reduced prices in the 
referencing countries (see also Chapter 4). Willingness to pay (represented by 
total health expenditure) and regulatory price-setting had no significant impact 
on price level, but ATC class did. The same study found that while international 
prices were on average 14.3% lower than prices in Germany, there were specific 
ATC classes for which Danish and Swedish prices were in fact higher than 
German prices (Cassel & Ulrich, 2012). 
The studies described so far did not explicitly consider discounts and/or 
rebates enforced by law or agreed between individual payers and manufacturers. 
The latter are impossible to capture as they are almost exclusively confidential. 
An Austrian study comparing 2013 prices for 30 cost-intensive medicines in 
16 EU countries encompasses separate calculations to account for the legally 
enforced “rebate”, or rather discount, implemented in Germany (Vogler, 
Zimmermann & Habl, 2014). Without considering this rebate, Germany was 
the country with the highest number of top prices in the sample. Once the rebate 
was taken into account, Sweden, Denmark and Austria had more top prices 
than Germany. It is important to note that rebates in other countries in the 
sample were not considered. Prices in the study varied by 25 to 251% without 
consideration of the German rebate; the variation spectrum was narrower 
once the rebate was included in calculations. The AMNOG regulation, which 
introduced value-based pricing in Germany, took effect in 2011; the authors of 
the aforementioned study comment on the fact that German prices were still 
relatively high two years later but the delay in demonstrable effect of introduced 
measures needs to be considered when interpreting these results.
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Table 9.1
Comparative price levels from four international comparisons
Source: Authors’ compilation based on mentioned references.
Notes: *The studies use price level indices, which constitute the ratio of PPP to exchange rate.
**A previous iteration of this study used average exchange rates over a six-month period.
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10. Conclusions
10. Conclusions
All countries employ a mix of regulatory mechanisms to contain pharmaceutical expenditure and ensure quality and efficiency in pharmaceutical care, albeit with varying configurations and rigour. 
This variation also influences the extent of publicly financed pharmaceutical 
costs. Overall, observed differences in pharmaceutical expenditure should 
be interpreted in conjunction with the differing volume and composition of 
consumption, and price levels, as well as dispensation practices and their 
impact on the measurement of pharmaceutical costs. 
While for some countries, timely and/or equitable access to new medicines 
may constitute a priority – or pose a substantial challenge – others may primarily 
be concerned with quality of care and containing public pharmaceutical 
expenditure. With the proliferation of specialty medicines and recent examples 
of high-cost pharmaceuticals with proven therapeutic benefit and substantial 
target populations, sustainability of financing in pharmaceutical care is another 
overarching concern to be addressed. 
Pharmaceutical prices are more or less directly controlled in all countries 
included in this study. Despite their widespread use, current pricing policies 
are not without their limitations. While external reference pricing may induce 
strategic launching or hamper lower pricing in countries with lower ability 
to pay, setting prices based on therapeutic benefit (and/or other elements of 
value) can also lead to patient access issues if companies decide to remove their 
products from the market due to unsatisfactory price levels. Nevertheless, value-
based pricing and other, more novel approaches are being increasingly discussed 
as alternatives to traditionally implemented mechanisms, but implementation 
difficulties would need to be addressed at national and European level. 
Despite the widespread use of external reference pricing in European 
countries, comparative studies show that prices have not converged as could 
be expected, at least for originator products. However, such comparisons are 
inherently plagued by a number of methodological limitations and should 
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therefore be interpreted with caution, particularly when using international 
benchmarks for pricing pharmaceutical products or in the context of 
reconsidering relevant regulation or policies. 
No definitive evidence has yet been produced on the effects of different 
cost-containment measures on patient outcomes. Depending on the foremost 
policy concerns in each country, different levers will have to be used to enable 
the delivery of appropriate care at affordable prices; monitoring of implemented 
regulation is vital to ensure that patient access and sustainability of financing 
are taken into account.
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Annex I
Additional visualizations of health expenditure (OECD, 
2016a)
A.1 
Public expenditure on “retail” pharmaceuticals and other medical non-durables as a 
share of GDP, 2004–2014
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A.2
Private expenditure on “retail” pharmaceuticals and other medical non-durables as a 
share of GDP, 2004–2014
Source: OECD, 2016a.
A.3
Public expenditure on “retail” pharmaceuticals and other medical non-durables as a 
share of current health expenditure, 2004–2014
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A.4
Private expenditure on “retail” pharmaceuticals and other medical non-durables as a 
share of current health expenditure, 2004–2014
Source: OECD, 2016a.
A.5 
Private per capita expenditure on “retail” pharmaceuticals and other medical  
non-durables (in US$ PPP), 2004–2014
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Austria
Key information
Population (2014) 8.5 M
Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (2014) 47 707 (US$ PPP)
Current Health Expenditure (CHE) as % of GDP (2014) 10.3%
Expenditure on retail pharmaceuticals and other 
medical non-durables as % of CHE (2014)
12.4%
Per capita expenditure on retail pharmaceuticals and 
other medical non-durables (2014)
609.2 (US$ PPP)
Organization of the health care system Social insurance system (sickness funds)
National regulatory authority responsible for marketing 
authorization
Austrian Federal Office for Safety in Health Care/AGES 
Medicines and Medical Devices Agency 
(Bundesamt für Sicherheit im Gesundheitswesen, BASG/
AGES Medizinmarktaufsicht)
Level of decision-making on pricing/reimbursement Central
Pricing: competent authority Federal Ministry of Health, Pricing Committee 
(Bundesministerium für Gesundheit, Preiskommission)
Scope of centralized pricing regulation Reimbursable medicines in the outpatient sector
Reimbursement: competent authority Main Association of Austrian Social Security Institutions 
(HVB)  
advised by its Pharmaceutical Evaluation Board (HEK)
(Hauptverband der österreichischen 
Sozialversicherungsträger, HVB/ Heilmittel-Evaluierungs-
Kommission, HEK)
Scope of centralized reimbursement decisions Pharmaceuticals in the outpatient sector (hospitals 
maintain own lists)
• Assessment of the scientific evidence HVB working groups
• Appraisal/ Recommendation on inclusion  
in positive list
HEK
• Final decision HVB Director
Sources: OECD, 2016a; 2016b; 2016c.
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Pricing and reimbursement in the outpatient sector, Austria
AM bedingt erstattet*
Authorization (BASG/AGES Medizinmarktaufsicht or EMA)
Ministry of Health
(advised by Pricing Committee)
Task: Calculation of the average EU-price for medicines applying for inclusion to the EKO
Procedure:  External reference pricing (ERP)
Main Association of Austrian Social Security Institutions, HBV
(advised by Pharmaceutical Evaluation Board, HEK)
RED BOX
HELLGELBE BOX
Freely prescribed medicines 
(partially indication-based)
GREEN BOX
Application by manufacturer to the Ministry of Health for price-setting 
“Waiting list” (costs covered only after ex-ante approval by sickness fund)
Maximal length of stay in red box: 180 days depending on availability of European prices
HEK advises on reimbursement based on HVB evidence assessment
Criteria: pharmacologic, medical/therapeutic, pharmacoeconomic
Final decision on reimbursement
YELLOW BOX
Conditionally reimbursed 
medicines
Ex-ante approval by health 
insurance needed
Medicines reimbursed for 
specific conditions
Ex-post control of prescription 
behaviour
LIGHT YELLOW BOX
Exceptionally 
reimbursable or not 
reimbursable
Not listed
Medicines not in the EKO
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Belgium
Key information
Population (2014) 11.2 M
Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (2014) 43 409 (US$ PPP)
Current Health Expenditure (CHE) as % of GDP (2014) 10.4%
Expenditure on retail pharmaceuticals and other 
medical non-durables as % of CHE (2014)
13.8%
Per capita expenditure on retail pharmaceuticals and 
other medical non-durables (2014)
623.0 (US$ PPP)
Organization of the health care system Social health insurance (sickness funds)
National regulatory authority responsible for marketing 
authorization
Federal Agency for Medicinal and Health Products 
(Federaal Agentschap voor Geneesmiddelen en 
Gezondheidsproducten, FAGG/Agence fédérale des 
médicaments et des produits de santé, AFMPS)
Level of decision-making on pricing/reimbursement Central 
Pricing: competent authority Ministry of Economic Affairs, Small and Medium-sized 
Enterprises, Self-Employment and Energy  
Minister decides advised by the Pricing Committee for 
Pharmaceuticals  
(Commission des Prix des Spécialités Pharmaceutiques, 
CPSP)
Scope of centralized pricing regulation Prescription-only medicines
Reimbursement: competent authority National Institute for Health and Disability Insurance 
(Rijksinstituut voor ziekte- en invaliditeitsverzekering, 
RIZIV/Institut National d’Assurance Maladie-Invalidité, 
INAMI)
Scope of centralized reimbursement decisions Outpatient and inpatient sectors
• Assessment of the scientific evidence INAMI/RIZIV working groups
• Appraisal/ Recommendation on inclusion  
in positive list
Commission for the Reimbursement of Pharmaceuticals 
(Commissie voor Tagemoetkoming Geneesmiddelen, CTG/
Commission de Remboursement des Médiacaments, 
GRM)
• Final decision Ministry of Social Affairs and Public Health
Sources: OECD, 2016a; 2016b; 2016c.
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Pricing and reimbursement in the outpatient sector, Belgium 
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Denmark
Key information
Population (2014) 5.6 M
Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (2014) 45 996 (US$ PPP)
Current Health Expenditure (CHE) as % of GDP (2014) 10.6%
Expenditure on retail pharmaceuticals and other 
medical non-durables as % of CHE (2014) 
Total pharmaceutical expenditure as % of total health 
care spending* (2014) (Lif, 2015)
6.7% 
 
12.4%
Per capita expenditure on retail pharmaceuticals and 
other medical non-durables (2014)
324.6 (US$ PPP)
Organization of the health care system Tax-financed (type “national health service”)
National regulatory authority responsible for marketing 
authorization
Danish Medicines Agency (Lægemiddelstyrelsen, DKMA)
Level of decision-making on pricing/reimbursement Central decision on whether a pharmaceutical is 
reimbursable.   Reimbursed amount: Percentage of 
cheapest generic prescription medicine on the market 
(manufacturers report prices every two weeks)
Pricing: competent authority Free pricing 
Scope of centralized pricing regulation None. Pharmaceuticals for hospital use are purchased at 
lowest possible prices through tenders and bulk 
purchasing (by AMGROS, the pharmaceutical procure-
ment service for the five regional authorities in Denmark)
Reimbursement: competent authority DKMA
Scope of centralized reimbursement decisions Prescription drugs for retail sale
• Assessment of the scientific evidence DKMA working groups
• Appraisal/ Recommendation on inclusion  
in positive list
Reimbursement Committee at the DKMA
• Final decision DKMA
Sources: Lif, 2015; OECD, 2016a; 2016b; 2016c; * not including costs for nursing home care (i.e. care and housing; 
pharmaceuticals which are purchased by the residents in retail receive reimbursement at the individual level and 
are included).
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Pricing and reimbursement in the outpatient sector, Denmark
Manufacturers
Free pricing 
(price updates at 14-day intervals)
Task: Decision on eligibility for general or conditional reimbursement
Criteria: Therapeutic benefit and cost-effectiveness
Recommendation on reimbursement status: Reimbursement Committee
DKMA
Market authorization: assessment of safety and efficacy
(alt. by EMA through centralized procedure)
General Reimbursement Conditional Reimbursement No Reimbursement
Prescription-only medicines 
(POMs)
POMs OTC pharmaceuticals
(Individual reimbursement 
possible in exceptional cases)
For specific diseases
For specific diseases or 
to 
pensioners in general
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Finland
Key information
Population (2014) 5.5 M
Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (2014) 40 694 (US$ PPP)
Current Health Expenditure (CHE) as % of GDP (2014) 9.5%
Expenditure on retail pharmaceuticals and other 
medical non-durables as % of CHE (2014)
12.3%
Per capita expenditure on retail pharmaceuticals and 
other medical non-durables (2014)
476.0 (US$ PPP)
Organization of the health care system Tax-financed system, delivery of health care organized at 
municipal level
National regulatory authority responsible for marketing 
authorization
Finnish Medicines Agency  
(Lääkealan turvallisuus- ja kehittämiskeskus, FIMEA)
Level of decision-making on pricing/reimbursement Central
Pricing: competent authority Pharmaceuticals Pricing Board (operates under the 
Ministry of Social Affairs and Health) 
(Lääkkeiden hintalautakunta, HILA)
Scope of centralized pricing regulation Wholesale prices of reimbursable pharmaceuticals
Reimbursement: competent authority HILA
Scope of centralized reimbursement decisions Outpatient sector (hospitals maintain own lists)
• Assessment of the scientific evidence HILA 
• Appraisal/ Recommendation on inclusion  
in positive list
Expert committee at HILA 
• Final decision HILA
Sources: OECD, 2016a; 2016b; 2016c.
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Pricing and reimbursement in the outpatient sector, Finland
HILA advised by Expert Committee: Decision on reimbursement status and reimbursement categories 
Criteria: Therapeutic benefit, medical and economic aspects,
Budget impact, severity of disease
Pricing
Task: Decision on wholesale price of reimbursable 
pharmaceuticals
Procedure: ERP/IRP
HILA (under the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health)
Basic 
Reimbursement
Lower Special 
Reimbursement
Higher Special 
Reimbursement
No Reimbursement
Reimbursement 40% 65% 100% 0%
Copayment 60% 35% 4.50€ per drug 100%
Disease-specific
(long-term diseases)
Disease-specific 
(long-term diseases)
Authorization (FIMEA or EMA)
Reimbursement application by manufacturer to HILA
Assessment of scientific evidence 
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France
Key information
Population (2014) 66.3 M
Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (2014) 39 301 (US$ PPP)
Current Health Expenditure (CHE) as % of GDP (2014) 11.1%
Expenditure on retail pharmaceuticals and other 
medical non-durables as % of CHE (2014)
15.0%
Per capita expenditure on retail pharmaceuticals and 
other medical non-durables (2014)
655.9 (US$ PPP)
Organization of the health care system Statutory Health Insurance with a single public payer, 
strongly tax-financed
National regulatory authority responsible for marketing 
authorization
French National Agency for Medicines and Health 
Products Safety (L’Agence nationale de sécurité du 
médicament et des produits de santé, ANSM)
Level of decision-making on pricing/reimbursement Central
Pricing: competent authority Economic Committee on Healthcare Products (under the 
joint authority of the Ministries of Health, and Economy) 
(Comité économique des produits de santé, CEPS)  
advised by the Transparency Committee (Commission de 
la Transparence, CT) and the Economic and Public Health 
Assessment Committee (Commission Evaluation 
Economique et de Santé Publique, CEESP), both at French 
National Authority for Health (Haute Authorité de Santé, 
HAS)
Scope of centralized pricing regulation Reimbursable pharmaceuticals in the outpatient sector 
(for the inpatient sector, only medicines used on top of 
DRGs, called “liste en sus” are subject to central price 
negotiations) 
Reimbursement: competent authority French National Union of Health Insurance Funds  
(Union nationale des caisses d’assurance maladie, 
UNCAM)
Scope of centralized reimbursement decisions Reimbursable pharmaceuticals in the in- and outpatient 
sectors
• Assessment of the scientific evidence HAS  
•  Transparency Committee (medical assessment) 
•  CEESP (health economic assessment)
• Appraisal/ Recommendation on inclusion  
in positive list
Transparency Committee at HAS
• Final decision Reimbursement level: UNCAM Inclusion into the positive 
list: Ministry of Social Affairs and Health
Sources: OECD, 2016a; 2016b; 2016c.
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Pricing and reimbursement in the outpatient sector, France
Link between clinical benefit (SMR), added clinical benefit (ASMR), reimbursement 
and price in France (based on Meyer, 2013)*
HAS
UNCAM (Health Insurance Fund)
Task: Determination of reimbursement and copayment levels
Criteria: SMR
CEPS
Task: Determination of price, publication of ex-factory and retail 
prices 
Criteria: Based on ASMR either EPR and/or negotiation
Ministry of Social Affairs and Health 
Task: Final decision on reimbursement, inclusion into the 
outpatient positive list
Authorization (ANSM or EMA)
Reimbursement application by manufacturer to the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, HAS, CEPS, UNCAM
SMR Reimbursement rates up to
high 65%
moderate 30%
low 15%
insufficient No reimbursement
Economic and Public Health Evaluation Commission 
(CEESP)
Task: Determination of ICER for highly innovative (ASMR I, II or III) and 
expensive medicines only
Transparency Commission 
Task: Determination of therapeutic benefit (Service médical rendu, SMR), added therapeutic benefit (Amelioration du Service Médical Rendu, ASMR) 
Criteria: Medical necessity, relative effectiveness, public health interest 
Recommendation 
Therapeutic benefit/SMR (high/moderate/low/insufficient)
Added benefit/ASMR (I – major/II – significant/III – moderate/IV – minor/V – absent)
• (Clinical) Therapeutic 
benefit
• Disease characteristics 
(severity)
• Target population
• Impact on
• Public health
• Health care 
organization
SMR
High/moderate/
low
Insufficient
ASMR
No ASMR
High to 
moderate ASMR 
(I–III)
No reimbursement
Price must be lower 
than comparatorsʼ
Possibly premium price 
consistent with 
European prices
Dimensions Criteria Results
P
R
I
C
I
N
G
Evaluation: Transparency Committee at HAS
Reimbursement level:
UNCAM
Price: Economic Committee
Additional therapeutic benefit 
compared to alternatives
R
E
I
M
B
U
R
S
E
M
E
N
T
Quelle: modifiziert nach HAS 2009
Minor ASMR 
(IV)
Depends (target 
population)
65%/30%/15%
* The economic evaluation process carried out by CEESP is not depicted
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Germany
Key information
Population (2014) 81.0 M
Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (2014) 46 394 (US$ PPP)
Current Health Expenditure (CHE) as % of GDP (2014) 11.0%
Expenditure on retail pharmaceuticals and other 
medical non-durables as % of CHE (2014)
14.5%
Per capita expenditure on retail pharmaceuticals and 
other medical non-durables (2014)
741.1 (US$ PPP)
Organization of the health care system Statutory health insurance (sickness funds)
National regulatory authority responsible for marketing 
authorization
Federal Institute for Drugs and Medical Devices 
(Bundesinstitut für Arzneimittel und Medizinprodukte, 
BfArM)
Level of decision-making on pricing/reimbursement Central
Pricing: competent authority National Association of Statutory Health Insurance 
Funds(GKV-Spitzenverband)
Scope of centralized pricing regulation Prescription-only medicines
Reimbursement: competent authority Federal Joint Committee  
(Gemeinsamer Bundesausschuss, G-BA)
Scope of centralized reimbursement decisions Outpatient sector
• Assessment of the scientific evidence Institute for Quality and Efficiency in Health Care  
(Institut für Qualität und Wirtschaftlichkeit im 
Gesundheitswesen, IQWiG)
• Appraisal/ Recommendation on inclusion  
in positive list
Federal Joint Committee 
• Final decision Reimbursement: Federal Joint Committee  
Price: National Association of Statutory Health Insurance 
Funds (in negotiation with manufacturers)"
Sources: OECD, 2016a; 2016b; 2016c.
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Pricing and reimbursement in the outpatient sector, Germany
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Greece
Key information
Population (2014) 10.9 M
Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (2014) 26 795 (US$ PPP)
Current Health Expenditure (CHE) as % of GDP (2014) 8.3%
Expenditure on retail pharmaceuticals and other 
medical non-durables as % of CHE (2014)
28.4%
Per capita expenditure on retail pharmaceuticals and 
other medical non-durables (2014)
629.6 (US$ PPP)
Organization of the health care system Mixed (Social insurance with a single payer and 
tax-financed components)
National regulatory authority responsible for marketing 
authorization
National Drug Organization (EOF)(Eλληνικός Οργανισμός 
Φαρμάκων, ΕΟΦ)
Level of decision-making on pricing/reimbursement All new authorized pharmaceuticals
Pricing: competent authority Ministry of Health (advised by EOF)
Scope of centralized pricing regulation All new authorized pharmaceuticals
Reimbursement: competent authority Ministry of Health (advised by Unified Social Security 
Fund [EOPYY])
Scope of centralized reimbursement decisions All new authorized pharmaceuticals
• Assessment of the scientific evidence None (informed by international HTAs on a case-by-case 
basis)
• Appraisal/ Recommendation on inclusion  
in positive list
EOPYY
• Final decision Ministry of Health 
Sources: OECD, 2016a; 2016b; 2016c.
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Pricing and reimbursement in the outpatient sector, Greece
Task: Surveying of the reimbursement status and prices in other EU countries (application of ERP), and subsequent price proposal to the MoH
EOPYY
Ministry of Health, Directorate for pharmaceuticals and health care products
Task: Final decision on inclusion into a list, final determination of ex-factory and pharmacy prices
Positive list
• 100% – essential medicines 
• 90% – disease-specific
• 75% – other pharmaceuticals
Negative list OTC list
Authorization (EOF or EMA)
Reimbursement application by manufacturer to the Ministry of Health
Ministry of Health
Recommendation on reimbursement and price
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Ireland
Key information
Population (2014) 4.6 M
Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (2014) 49 377 (US$ PPP)
Current Health Expenditure (CHE) as % of GDP (2014) 10.1%
Expenditure on retail pharmaceuticals and other 
medical non-durables as % of CHE (2014)
14.1%
Per capita expenditure on retail pharmaceuticals and 
other medical non-durables (2014)
703.4 (US$ PPP)
Organization of the health care system Tax-financed (additional private health insurance covers 
approximately half of the population)
National regulatory authority responsible for marketing 
authorization
Health Products Regulatory Authority (HPRA)
Level of decision-making on pricing/reimbursement Central
Pricing: competent authority Health Service Executive (HSE), Corporate 
Pharmaceutical Unit
Scope of centralized pricing regulation All authorized pharmaceuticals
Reimbursement: competent authority HSE, Primary Care Reimbursement Service
Scope of centralized reimbursement decisions All authorized pharmaceuticals
• Assessment of the scientific evidence National Centre for Pharmacoeconomics (NCPE)
• Appraisal/ Recommendation on inclusion  
in positive list
HSE
• Final decision HSE
Sources: OECD, 2016a; 2016b; 2016c.
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Pricing and reimbursement in the outpatient sector, Ireland
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Italy
Key information
Population (2014) 60.8 M
Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (2014) 35 419 (US$ PPP)
Current Health Expenditure (CHE) as % of GDP (2014) 9.1%
Expenditure on retail pharmaceuticals and other 
medical non-durables as % of CHE (2014)
17.0%
Per capita expenditure on retail pharmaceuticals and 
other medical non-durables (2014)
544.2 (US$ PPP)
Organization of the health care system Tax-financed, regionally organized National Health Service 
(regions are in charge of organizing and providing health 
care)
National regulatory authority responsible for marketing 
authorization
Italian Medicines Agency  
(Agenzia Italiana del Farmaco, AIFA)
Level of decision-making on pricing/reimbursement Central
Pricing: competent authority AIFA (negotiation process with manufacturer)
Scope of centralized pricing regulation All authorized pharmaceuticals
Reimbursement: competent authority AIFA (negotiation process with manufacturer)
Scope of centralized reimbursement decisions All authorized pharmaceuticals
• Assessment of the scientific evidence Technical Scientific Committee at AIFA
• Appraisal/ Recommendation on inclusion  
in positive list
Pricing and Reimbursement Committee at AIFA
• Final decision Pricing and Reimbursement Committee at AIFA
Sources: OECD, 2016a; 2016b; 2016c.
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Pricing and reimbursement in the in- and outpatient sector, Italy
Recommendation on price and reimbursement
Pricing and Reimbursement Committee
Criteria: Disease relevance, added therapeutic value, prices of comparators, prices in other EU countries (ERP) , expected sales volumes, Budget 
impact
Class A
Full or partial reimbursement
(regions determine copayments) 
Essential medicines for severe, 
chronic or acute illness requiring 
prescription
In many cases with prescription 
limitations
Class C
No reimbursement
(regional exceptions possible)
Medicines with and without prescription
AIFA
Authorization 
(alt. by EMA through centralized procedure)
Assessment of evidence
Technical Scientific Committee
Decision on reimbursement and price
Manufacturer
Class H
Medicines reimbursed only in 
hospital settings (most are hospital-
only medicines)
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Netherlands
Key information
Population (2014) 16.9 M
Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (2014) 48 253 (US$ PPP)
Current Health Expenditure (CHE) as % of GDP (2014) 10.9%
Expenditure on retail pharmaceuticals and other 
medical non-durables as % of CHE (2014)
7.6%
Per capita expenditure on retail pharmaceuticals and 
other medical non-durables (2014)
400.7 (US$ PPP)
Organization of the health care system Social insurance (health care funds)
National regulatory authority responsible for marketing 
authorization
Medicines Evaluation Board  
(College ter Beoordeling van Geneesmiddelen, CBG)
Level of decision-making on pricing/reimbursement Central
Pricing: competent authority Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport
Scope of centralized pricing regulation Calculation of maximum prices, all pharmaceuticals
Reimbursement: competent authority National Health Care Institute (Zorginstituut Nederland, 
ZINL; former College voor zorgverzekeringen, CVZ)
Scope of centralized reimbursement decisions All pharmaceuticals in the outpatient sector and 
cost-intensive pharmaceuticals in the inpatient sector 
• Assessment of the scientific evidence ZINL working groups (advised by Scientific Advisory 
Committee)
• Appraisal/ Recommendation on inclusion  
in positive list
ZINL Board
• Final decision Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport  cost-intensive 
medicines: Dutch Healthcare Authority (Nederlandse 
Zorgautoriteit (NZa))
Sources: OECD, 2016a; 2016b; 2016c.
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Pricing and reimbursement in the outpatient sector, Netherlands
Task: Recommendation on reimbursement status
Criteria: Necessity, effectiveness, cost-effectiveness, Budget impact
Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport (VWS)
National Health Care Institute (ZINL)
Authorization (CBG or EMA)
Reimbursement application by manufacturer to the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport
Task:  Calculation of maximum prices
Procedure:  External reference pricing (ERP)
Scientific Advisory Committee: Appraisal is based on the evidence and stakeholder input
Positive reimbursement list (GVS)
Outpatient sector
Annex 1A
Therapeutically 
comparable benefit (no 
added benefit)
Annex 1B
With therap. added 
benefit
Annex 2
Conditional 
reimbursement (if appl. 
drugs within 1A or 1B)
OTC - medicines
Reimbursement up to 
the average price of the 
group
Full reimbursement “A priori” approval 
needed, restricted 
indication
No reimbursement
Positive list for cost-intensive 
medicines
in the inpatient sector
Preliminary inclusion in the CED-plan 
(four years), additional financing (no 
copayment)
Ministry VWS: Final decision on inclusion into the positive list Dutch Healthcare Authority (NZa): 
Final decision on inclusion into the 
list of cost-intensive medicines
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Poland
Key information
Population (2014) 38.0 M
Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (2014) 25 262 (US$ PPP)
Current Health Expenditure (CHE) as % of GDP (2014) 6.4%
Expenditure on retail pharmaceuticals and other 
medical non-durables as % of CHE (2014)
20.9%
Per capita expenditure on retail pharmaceuticals and 
other medical non-durables (2014)
339.0 (US$ PPP)
Organization of the health care system Social insurance with a single payer, subsidized by tax 
contributions
National regulatory authority responsible for marketing 
authorization
Office for Registration of Medicinal Products, Medical 
Devices and Biocides (Urząd Rejestracji Produktów 
Leczniczych, Wyrobów Medycznych i Produktów Biobójczych)
Level of decision-making on pricing/reimbursement Central
Pricing: competent authority Ministry of Health (negotiation process with 
manufacturer)
Scope of centralized pricing regulation Reimbursable pharmaceuticals (free pricing for 
non-reimbursable pharmaceuticals)
Reimbursement: competent authority Ministry of Health, advised by the Polish HTA agency 
(AOTMiT, see below)
Scope of centralized reimbursement decisions Reimbursable pharmaceuticals
• Assessment of the scientific evidence Agency for Health Technology Assessment  
(Agencja Oceny Technologii Medycznych i Taryfikacji, 
AOTMiT)
• Appraisal/ Recommendation on inclusion  
in positive list
Transparency Council of AOTMiT (Rada Przejrzystości)
• Final decision Ministry of Health
Sources: OECD, 2016a; 2016b; 2016c.
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Pricing and reimbursement in the outpatient sector, Poland
AOTMiT
Decision revision
For every medicine step-wise: 
after two, three or five years
Authorization (Office for Registration or EMA)
Reimbursement application by manufacturer to the Ministry of Health and subsequently AOTMiT
Manufacturer
Assessment of the scientific evidence
AOTMiT working groups
Appraisal/ Statement of Transparency Council
Appraisal/Recommendation of President of AOTMiT on inclusion in the positive list
Criteria: clinical effectiveness, safety, cost-effectiveness, budget impact, epidemiologic relevance, necessity
Positive list Not listed
100% reimbursement Flat fee copayment 50% reimbursement 70% reimbursement No reimbursement (free pricing)
Certain chronic 
conditions (e.g. 
cancer, mental 
disorders) medicines 
covered in therapeutic 
programmes
Duration of treatment 
>30 days or monthly 
costs above certain 
limits
Duration of treatment 
< 30 days Medicines in none of the previous categories
Medicines not applied 
for reimbursement
Ministry of Health
Price determination
Procedure: ERP, IRP, value-based elements
Final decision on reimbursement
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Portugal
Key information
Population (2014) 10.4 M
Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (2014) 28 760 (US$ PPP)
Current Health Expenditure (CHE) as % of GDP (2014) 9.0%
Expenditure on retail pharmaceuticals and other 
medical non-durables as % of CHE (2014)
15.4%
Per capita expenditure on retail pharmaceuticals and 
other medical non-durables (2014)
398.6 (US$ PPP)
Organization of the health care system National social insurance system (tax-financed); special 
public and private insurance schemes for certain 
professions (~25% of population); and private insurance 
(from 10% to 20% of population).
National regulatory authority responsible for marketing 
authorization
National Authority of Medicines and Health Products 
(Autoridade Nacional do Medicamento e Produtos de 
Saúde, I.P., INFARMED)
Level of decision-making on pricing/reimbursement Central
Pricing: competent authority INFARMED
Scope of centralized pricing regulation Outpatient sector  
Prescription-only medicines and reimbursable OTC 
medicines (hospitals negotiate prices independently)
Reimbursement: competent authority INFARMED
Scope of centralized reimbursement decisions Outpatient sector  
Prescription-only medicines and reimbursable OTC 
medicines Inpatient sector: in- or exclusion (hospitals 
maintain own lists)
• Assessment of the scientific evidence INFARMED working groups
• Appraisal/ Recommendation on inclusion  
in positive list
INFARMED
• Final decision Outpatient sector: Ministry of Health 
Inpatient sector: INFARMED
Sources: OECD, 2016a; 2016b; 2016c.
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Pricing and reimbursement in the outpatient sector, Portugal
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Spain
Key information
Population (2014) 46.5 M 
Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (2014) 33 625 (US$ PPP)
Current Health Expenditure (CHE) as % of GDP (2014) 9.1%
Expenditure on retail pharmaceuticals and other 
medical non-durables as % of CHE (2014)
17.9%
Per capita expenditure on retail pharmaceuticals and 
other medical non-durables (2014)
546.9 (US$ PPP)
Organization of the health care system Tax-financed
National regulatory authority responsible for marketing 
authorization
Spanish Medicines and Medical Devices Agency  
(Agencia Española de Medicamentos y Productos 
Sanitarios, AEMPS)
Level of decision-making on pricing/reimbursement Central (implementation of regulatory measures falls to 
Autonomous Communities, who can negotiate their own 
Managed Entry Agreements)
Pricing: competent authority Inter-ministerial Commission for Pricing
Scope of centralized pricing regulation Authorized pharmaceuticals
Reimbursement: competent authority Ministry of Health, Directorate-general for Pharmacy and 
Healthcare Products  
(Dirección General Cartera Básica de Servicios y Farmacia, 
DGCF)
Scope of centralized reimbursement decisions Authorized pharmaceuticals
• Assessment of the scientific evidence Ministry of Health working groups
• Appraisal/ Recommendation on inclusion  
in positive list
DGCF
• Final decision Ministry of Health
Sources: OECD, 2016a; 2016b; 2016c.
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Pricing and reimbursement in the outpatient sector, Spain
Ministry of Health 
(DGCF)
Positive list
Copayment between 10% 
and 60% depending on 
income group; 10% for 
certain chronic conditions 
Inter-ministerial Commission for Pricing
Negative list
OTC medicines
Not reimbursable POMs 
Authorization (AEMPS or EMA)
Task: Decision on reimbursement status and group
Criteria: product-specific (ATC-group)
Task: Determination of price
Criteria: IRP, if applicable ERP
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Sweden
Key information
Population (2014) 9.7 M 
Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (2014) 45 298 (US$ PPP)
Current Health Expenditure (CHE) as % of GDP (2014) 11.2%
Expenditure on retail pharmaceuticals and other 
medical non-durables as % of CHE (2014)
9.6%
Per capita expenditure on retail pharmaceuticals and 
other medical non-durables (2014)
488.7 (US$ PPP)
Organization of the health care system Tax-financed
National regulatory authority responsible for marketing 
authorization
Medical Products Agency  
(Läkemedelsverket, LV)
Level of decision-making on pricing/reimbursement Central (implementation of decision at local and regional 
level by County Councils)
Pricing: competent authority Dental and Pharmaceutical Benefits Agency  
(Tandvårds- & läkemedelsförmånsverket, TLV)
Scope of centralized pricing regulation Outpatient sector, prescription-only medicines  
(Free-pricing of over-the-counter and inpatient medicines; 
prices for the latter negotiated by County Councils)
Reimbursement: competent authority TLV
Scope of centralized reimbursement decisions Outpatient sector, prescription-only medicines
• Assessment of the scientific evidence TLV working groups and/or Swedish Agency for Health 
Technology Assessment and Assessment of Social 
Services  
(Statens beredning för medicinsk utvärdering, SBU)
• Appraisal/ Recommendation on inclusion  
in positive list
TLV – expert board
• Final decision TLV (implementation: County Councils)
Sources: OECD, 2016a; 2016b; 2016c.
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Pricing and reimbursement in the outpatient sector, Sweden
Task: Determination of reimbursement status, pharmacy mark-up, (pharmacy) retail price
Criteria: human value, need and solidarity, cost-effectiveness, disease severity
TLV
General Reimbursement Restricted Reimbursement No Reimbursement
Conditions Product-specific
Potentially indication-based restrictions if varying 
cost-effectiveness ratios (at manufacturer’s 
suggested price)
Provisional coverage with evidence 
generation (at manufacturer’s suggested 
price)
Product specific
+
All OTC medicines (free 
pricing)
Copayment based on total out-of-pocket expenses for medicines
Authorization (LV or EMA)
Reimbursement application by manufacturer including price proposal
Assessment of the scientific evidence (TLV working groups)
TLV Expert Board appraises and decides, taking into account stakeholder input
County Councils
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United Kingdom
Key information
Population (2014) 64.6 M  
England: 54.3 M  
Scotland: 5.3 M  
Wales: 3.1 M  
N. Ireland: 1.8 M
Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (2014) 40 217 (US$ PPP)
Current Health Expenditure (CHE) as % of GDP (2014) 9.9% 
Expenditure on retail pharmaceuticals and other 
medical non-durables as % of CHE (2014)
12.2%
Per capita expenditure on retail pharmaceuticals and 
other medical non-durables (2014)
485.3 (US$ PPP)
Organization of the health care system Tax-financed
National regulatory authority responsible for marketing 
authorization
Medicines and Health Care Products Regulatory Agency 
(MHRA)
Level of decision-making on pricing/reimbursement Pricing: central, within the “Pharmaceutical Price 
Regulation Scheme” (PPRS)   
Reimbursement: Country- and payer-specific
Pricing: competent authority Department of Health (DoH), Negotiation with 
manufacturers (Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme, 
PPRS)
Scope of centralized pricing regulation Authorized pharmaceuticals
Reimbursement: competent authority England: National Institute for Health and Care Excellence 
(NICE)  
Scotland: Scottish Medicines Consortium (SMC)
Scope of centralized reimbursement decisions NICE: new/innovative pharmaceuticals (“single 
technology appraisal”), reimbursable pharmaceuticals 
(“multiple technology appraisal”)  
SMC: new/innovative pharmaceuticals
• Assessment of the scientific evidence England: scientific working groups commissioned by 
NICE  
Scotland: SMC working groups
• Appraisal/ Recommendation on inclusion  
in positive list
England: NICE  
Scotland: SMC
• Final decision England: Clinical Commissioning Groups  
Scotland: NHS Boards (“area drug committees”)
Sources: OECD, 2016a; 2016b; 2016c; ONS, 2016a; 2016b; 2016c; 2016d.
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Pricing and reimbursement in the outpatient sector, United Kingdom – England
Pricing and reimbursement in the outpatient sector, United Kingdom – Scotland
NICE 
Authorization (MHRA or EMA)
Department of Health
Task: Agreement with manufacturers on list/reimbursement price (PPRS)
Negative list
At national level
Positive list
Per CCG
Clinical Commissioning Groups
Decision on reimbursement
Recommendation on reimbursement status 
at determined price
Criteria: clinical and cost-effectiveness
Assessment of the scientific evidence
(support of external centres)
Manufacturer
Full reimbursement
Restricted reimbursement (“optimized”)
Coverage with evidence development
No reimbursement
SMC 
Authorization (MHRA or EMA)
Department of Health 
(at national level)
Task: Agreement with manufacturers on 
list/reimbursement price (PPRS)
Negative list
In force at national level
Positive list
Per NHS Board
NHS Boards/ADCs
Decision on reimbursement
Recommendation on reimbursement status at determined price
Criteria: clinical and cost-effectiveness
Assessment of the scientific evidence
Manufacturer
Full reimbursement
Restricted reimbursement
Coverage with evidence development
No reimbursement
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